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The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution provide that the federal
and state governments shall not deprive persons of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.' More than a guarantee of
procedural due process, it is now well settled that a "substantive
component" of the clauses protects "individual liberty against
'certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the pro-
cedures used to implement them." Government cannot "infringe
certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what pro-
cess is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."' Substantive due process' law
and doctrine are thus established (but, for some, controversial)
features of constitutional law.' In a recent ruling, the Sixth Cir-
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1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."); id., amend. XIV § 1 ("No State shall ... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
2. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
3. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
4. "Substantive due process" is a phrase "that borders on oxymoron." AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE
BY 119 (2012); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) ("'[Slubstantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort
of like 'green pastel redness."').
5. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3062 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("The notion that a con-
stitutional provision that guarantees only 'process' before a person is deprived of life, liber-
ty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the
most casual user of words."); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION 147 (1982) ("Substantive due process is not a function of politically ag-
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cuit rejected a challenge to anti-same-sex marriage laws and
held, among other things, that the Due Process Clause did not
provide or protect a fundamental right to marry a person of the
6
same sex.
Do state constitutional provisions and statutes prohibiting
same-sex marriage infringe on a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause? In three recent decisions,
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits answered that question in the affirmative.! In each case,
a majority of a three-judge panel determined that the claimed
right to same-sex marriage was fundamental and that the state's
ban of such marriages did not withstand strict scrutiny judicial
review. This construction of the Due Process Clause prevailed
over dissenting judges' determinations that the asserted right to
same-sex marriage was not fundamental because such marriage
was not deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition, and
was not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.!
In the aforementioned appeals courts' rulings one finds an in-
terpretative disagreement also found in the Supreme Court of the
United States' substantive due process decisions. Over the years
the Court and individual Justices have debated the pertinent
framing of a particular due process claim and the level of general-
ity governing the judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of the
governmental action at issue.o As a judge enjoys discretion in
framing the due process inquiry and in choosing the appropriate
generalization to characterize a right," the framing and generali-
gressive judges who have lost their heads and are acting as would-be legislators, abandon-
ing any sense of judicial self-restraint. Rather, the doctrine is the necessary product of the
superimposition onto a state system of plenary authority, of a federal court system com-
mitted to preserving those individual liberties that animated the limited federal Constitu-
tion.").
6. Deboer v. Snyder, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21191, at *55 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2014).
7. See infra Part IV.A; Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. de-
nied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1096 (10th Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
8. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 377-84; Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1079; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at
1218-19.
9. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 385 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1109,
1112-13 (Kelly, J., dissenting); Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1234 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
10. See Patrick S. Shin, Discrimination Under a Description, 47 GA. L. REV. 1, 33-34
& n.105-06, 36 & n.114 (2012).
11. Id. at 33.
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ty determinations can be outcome-influential, if not outcome-
determinative."
For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick the Court narrowly
framed the due process issue as "whether the Federal Constitu-
tion confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that
still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time."'" Thereafter, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court framed the
question in a case challenging state-law criminalization of same-
sex intimate conduct more broadly: "[W]hether the petitioners
were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exer-
cise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause." 4 Lawrence
concluded that Bowers' framing revealed the Court's inability to
perceive the extent of the threatened liberty interest.'" As can be
seen, the framing of the claimed right-which can be influenced
by an interpreter's value choices and objectives-is a critical de-
scriptive and normative matter.1 6
How should the asserted right to same-sex marriage be framed
and characterized? Consider the Tenth Circuit's Kitchen v. Her-
bert decision, wherein the majority opinion asked "whether the
liberty interest protected in this case includes the right to marry,
and whether that right is limited ... to those who would wed a
person of the opposite sex."" The dissenting judge asked a differ-
ent question, which he also answered in the negative: whether
the claimed right to same-sex marriage was deeply rooted in the
nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.'" Asking whether a man who wishes to marry a
man, or a woman who seeks to marry a woman, has the same
right to marry enjoyed by opposite-sex couples is critically differ-
ent from the narrower question of whether marrying a person of
12. See generally Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and Discretionary Tra-
ditionalism, 66 SMU L. REV. 841, 846-47 (2013) (discussing the discretionary nature of
traditionalist methodology as employed by Supreme Court Justices and federal appeals
court judges).
13. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
14. 539 U.S. at 564.
15. Id. at 567 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190).
16. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73
(1991).
17. 755 F.3d 1193, 1208 (10th Cir. 2014).
18. See id. at 1230, 1234 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
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the same sex is a right already recognized in the nation's history
and tradition." The significance of the chosen framings for the
analysis and resolution of the same-sex marriage issue is mani-
fest, since the results of any fundamental rights inquiry rests
completely on the characterization of the rights in question.2 0 It is
thus not surprising that the Kitchen majority struck down and
that the dissent would have upheld the challenged laws.2 1
This article examines the role that tradition and traditionalism
have long played, and continue to play, in the Supreme Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence, and considers the implica-
tions of due process traditionalism22 for judicial resolution of cases
presenting due process challenges to state prohibitions of same-
sex marriage." Part I considers the ways in which tradition-
19. Latta v. Otter, No. 14-35420, 2014 WL 4977682, at *12 (9th Cir. Oct. 7, 2014)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring).
20. See Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1490 (2008).
21. 755 F.3d at 1199 (holding that the Due Process Clause allows couples of the same
sex to have the same fundamental rights as couples of the opposite sex who wish to mar-
ry); id. at 1230 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (stating that the fundamental right to marry does
not extend to same-sex couples).
22. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING
DOCUMENT DOESN'T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 93-96 (2009) (discussing "due process
traditionalism" and the justifications for this approach).
23. This article focuses on due process and same-sex marriage. Baskin v. Bogan sets
out an equal protection analysis where Judge Richard Posner, writing for a unanimous
three-judge panel, concluded that Indiana's and Wisconsin's same-sex marriage bans vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause as they
discriminate against a minority defined by an immutable characteristic, and
the only rationale that the states put forth with any conviction-that same-
sex couples and their children don't need marriage because same-sex couples
can't produce children, intended or unintended-is so full of holes that it can-
not be taken seriously.
766 F.3d. 648, 656-57 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014). Accordingly, the
"discrimination against same-sex couples is irrational, and therefore unconstitutional even
if the discrimination is not subjected to heightened scrutiny, which is why we can largely
elide the more complex analysis found in more closely balanced equal-protection cases." Id.
at 656. Having decided the matter on equal protection grounds, Judge Posner did not en-
gage the plaintiffs' additional argument that the states' bans violate a fundamental right
protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 656-57. The plaintiffs contended "that the
right to choose whom to marry is indeed a fundamental right;" the states argued that the
Supreme Court has recognized the right to marry in cases wherein the right to choose in-
volved a choice "within the class of persons eligible to marry, thus excluding children, close
relatives, and persons already married-and, the states contended, persons of the same
sex." Id. at 657 (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385-86 (1978)). The plaintiffs responded that the "good reasons for
ineligibility to marry children, close relatives, and the already married" do not apply to
same-sex couples who wish to marry. Id. at 657; see also Latta, 2014 WL 4977682, at *1
(holding that Idaho and Nevada prohibitions of same-sex marriage violate the Equal Pro-
582 [Vol. 49:579
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understood as the label for the accumulated practices that we no
longer scrutinize and that we accept without question 2 -has long
been a factor referenced by the Court and individual Justices in
substantive due process cases." Part II focuses on due process
traditionalism. More than a reference to tradition, this methodol-
ogy interprets and applies the Constitution "in accordance with
the long-standing and evolving practices, experiences, and tradi-
tion of the nation."" Burkean in its foundation, traditionalism
looks for answers to contemporary legal questions in history and
tradition.2" As Part II discusses, the identification and application
of the pertinent and operative tradition and history has been the
subject of a longstanding, ongoing, and important debate among
the Justices. Part III turns to traditionalism and the Court's sex-
ual orientation jurisprudence. It examines the Court's decisions
in Bowers and Lawrence and its invalidation of a provision of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act in United States v. Windsor.2 8
tection Clause). See generally Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of
Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2011) (discussing that tradition is suffi-
cient justification to uphold discriminatory laws such as the ban on same-sex marriage
when challenged under the Equal Protection Clause); Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty
and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817 (2014) (examin.
ing the jurisprudential implications of due process and equal protection in same-sex mar-
riage).
24. David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1991).
25. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo's Feather: An Examination and
Critique of the Supreme Court's Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Funda-
mental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court's incon-
sistent use of the tradition test as applied to fundamental rights and proposing state
counting as a means of defining "tradition").
26. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1127, 1133 (1998).
27. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 81 (Frank M.
Turner ed., 2003). Burke cautioned that current generations should not ignore the past
lest the temporary possessors and life-renters in it, unmindful of what they
have received from their ancestors, or of what is due to their posterity, should
act as if they were the entire masters; that they should not think it among
their rights to cut off the entail, or commit waste on the inheritance, by de-
stroying at their pleasure the whole original fabric of their society. . . . By this
unprincipled facility of changing the state as often, and as much, and in as
many ways, as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole chain and
continuity of the commonwealth would be broken. No one generation could
link with the other. Men would become little better than the flies of a sum-
mer.
Id.
28. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _, _, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding
that the Defense of Marriage Act is invalid); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79
(2003) (stating that the word "liberty" in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments takes
down oppressive laws); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the
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With the backdrop of the preceding parts in mind, Part IV exam-
ines the Fourth and Tenth Circuits' recent decisions striking
down anti-same-sex-marriage laws in Virginia, Oklahoma, and
Utah, and the Sixth Circuit's validation of such laws in Kentucky,
Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. It also explores the ways in
which the judicial framing and description of the claimed liberty
interest play a critical role in the outcomes reached by those
courts. Part V concludes with brief closing remarks and predicts
that a majority of the current Court will someday conclude that
same-sex couples have the same fundamental right to marry en-
joyed by opposite-sex couples.
I. TRADITION
Being cognizant of tradition means being aware of established
structures of social life and conventions as communicated to oth-
ers who may accept these structures or conventions without ques-
tion.2 9 Sources of tradition include laws, government practices,
and even statements by persons that claim to represent social
mores." For a traditionalist, "one should be very careful about re-
jecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively
and in good faith, especially when those judgments have been re-
affirmed . . over time."
This part surveys the Supreme Court's references to, and uses
of, traditions in substantive due process cases.
A. Early Cases
The Supreme Court and the individual Justices have referred
to and relied upon tradition in substantive due process cases chal-
lenging certain governmental conduct.3 2 For example, in the in-
famous Dred Scott v. Sandford decision (the cradle of substantive
due process), 3 the Court looked to history and tradition as it con-
morality of homosexuality is inadequate to invalidate anti-sodomy laws).
29. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 85 (1998).
30. Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 181-82 (1993).
31. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 891 (1996).
32. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 192 (1996) ("[I]t
is traditional for Supreme Court Justices to rely on tradition. . . .).
33. Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case: With Notes on Affirmative Action, The
584 [Vol. 49:579
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cluded that enslaved persons of African descent and their progeny
were not, and could not, be citizens under the meaning of the
Constitution.3 4 The Court relied on several instruments including
the relevant histories and legislation at the time, the language
provided in the Declaration of Independence, and the public his-
tory of European States." The Court declared that blacks had
long been viewed in an inferior light, unfit to affiliate with
whites, either socially or politically; so inferior, that they lacked
any rights that whites must respect." During this period, this
view was "fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white
race [and was] regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in poli-
tics.""
Court decisions addressing discrimination against women also
referenced traditional and discriminatory views. In Bradwell v.
State, the Court held that the state of Illinois did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment when it denied a married woman the
right to practice law." Concurring Justice Joseph Bradley argued
that the inherent timidness of women rendered them unfit for a
number of occupations and that the "family organization. . .
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly be-
longs to the domain and functions of womanhood."" A woman's
"paramount destiny and mission" was "to fulfil [sic] the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the general con-
stitution of things."40 In Muller v. Oregon the Court upheld the
conviction of an employer for violating a state law by allowing a
female employee to work more than ten hours in one day.4 1 The
Court stated that "history discloses the fact that woman has al-
ways been dependent upon man [and must] look to him for pro-
Right to Die & Same-Sex Marriage, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 39, 40 (1997), available at http://
www.greenbag.org/vlnl/vlnl-sunstein.pdf; see also AMAR, supra note 4 (noting that Dred
Scott is one of the "most notorious" Supreme Court opinions).
34. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857).
35. Id. at 407.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872).
39. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 141-42.
41. 208 U.S. 412, 418, 423 (1908).
2015] 585
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tection."42 The state was therefore justified in enacting legislation
to safeguard women from "the greed [and] the passion" of men.43
Consider the tradition referent and criminal law proceedings.
Twining v. New Jersey rejected the argument that the Fifth
Amendment's exemption from compulsory self-incrimination was
one of the fundamental rights that the Fourteenth Amendment
safeguarded against state action.44 Noting that "[flew phrases of
the law are so elusive of exact apprehension" as the Due Process
Clause, the Court declared that what constitutes
due process of law may be ascertained by an examination of those
settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and
statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and
shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition
by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this coun-
45try.
The self-incrimination privilege, according to the Twining Court,
"has no place in the jurisprudence of civilized and free countries
outside the domain of the common law, and it is nowhere ob-
served among our own people in the search for truth outside the
administration of the law."
Snyder v. Massachusetts, holding that a defendant's presence
at a jury view of a crime scene was not a constitutionally protect-
ed right, opined that a state was "free to regulate the procedure of
its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and
fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."4 In Palko v. Connecticut the Court held
that the privilege against double jeopardy was not applicable to
the states via the Due Process Clause.48 Speaking for the Court,
Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo asked whether the claimed
privilege was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."" He
wrote that due process protects only those rights making up "the
42. Id. at 421-22.
43. Id. at 422.
44. 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
45. Id. at 99-100.
46. Id. at 113.
47. 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
48. 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
49. Id. at 324-25.
586 [Vol. 49:579
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very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" such that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."" As the
immunity from compulsory self-incrimination could be sacrificed
without affecting justice, the asserted privilege was not ranked as
fundamental." As this article demonstrates, Snyder's rooted-in-
tradition formulation and Palko's concept-of-ordered-liberty ap-
proach are important components of one variation of contempo-
rary due process traditionalism.52
Plaintiffs' tradition-based substantive due process challenges to
state regulation of educational and parental control matters pre-
vailed in Meyer v. Nebraska" and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.4
Meyer struck down a Nebraska law prohibiting the teaching of a
foreign language to students who had not passed the eighth
grade." The Court noted that liberty
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.
The Court concluded that the statute at issue deprived students
of the liberty and right to learn a foreign language, noting that
Americans have always esteemed education and learning as mat-
ters of great importance, requiring diligent promotion."
In Pierce, the Court applied Meyer in holding that an Oregon
statute requiring public school attendance by children between
the ages of eight and sixteen "unreasonably interfere[d] with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and ed-
ucation of children under their control."" Liberty "excludes any
50. Id. at 325-26.
51. Id. at 325.
52. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
53. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
54. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
55. 262 U.S. at 396-97, 403.
56. Id. at 399.
57. Id. at 400.
58. 268 U.S. at 531, 534-35 (citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-03).
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general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only."5
B. The 1960s
In the 1960s the Court referenced tradition as it considered
lawsuits alleging that state laws criminalizing certain reproduc-
tive practices and choices violated the Due Process Clause.
Poe v. Ullman accepted for review, and then dismissed as not
justiciable, a challenge to a Connecticut statute making it a crime
to use or give medical advice concerning the use of contracep-
tives."o Dissenting, Justice John Marshall Harlan II set out his
view of the meaning of the clause.6 1 According to Justice Harlan,
"The best that can be said is that through the course of this
Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Na-
tion, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the indi-
vidual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of orga-
nized society."62 This balance "is the balance struck by this
country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions
from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. That tradition is a living thing."6 3 Justice Harlan cautioned
that judges should not venture into the realm of "unguided specu-
lation"" and "may not draw on our merely personal and private
notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial
function."" He also made clear his view that there could be no
substitute for judgment and restraint in this area" and his recog-
59. Id. at 535. The Court, referencing Meyer and Pierce, has noted that "it cannot now
be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fun-
damental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); see also Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) ("[Tlhe 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process
Clause includes the right[| . .. to direct the education and upbringing of one's children");
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and culture of Western civiliza-
tion reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now estab-
lished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.").
60. 367 U.S. 497, 497-98, 508-09 (1961).
61. Id. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 542.
65. Id. at 544 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952)).
66. Id. at 542.
[Vol. 49:579588
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nition of "considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the com-
pelling traditions of the legal profession.""
The Court subsequently invalidated the Connecticut anti-
contraceptive use statute in Griswold v. Connecticut." The Court
held that the law intruded on the right of marital privacy located
in the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights "formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.""
The Court observed that marriage was an institution "older than
the Bill of Rights" and "an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.""
Joining the Court's opinion and relying on the Ninth Amend-
ment," Justice Arthur Goldberg argued that judges should look to
tradition and the collective conscience of the American people
when determining whether a principle is to be considered a fun-
damental right.72 Justice Hugo Black found the statute "abhor-
rent, just viciously evil, but not unconstitutional."" "I like my pri-
vacy as well as the next one," he wrote, "but I am nevertheless
compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it un-
less prohibited by some specific constitutional provision."" It was
not "the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with
67. Id. at 545 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171). Interestingly, Justice Harlan would
not have provided due process protection against state laws disapproving of certain sexual
conduct. He argued that society was traditionally concerned with the "moral soundness of
its people" and believed that "to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is
purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of
subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal." Id. at
546. In his view, laws regarding marriage and prohibiting sexual intimacies between per-
sons of the same sex, fornication, and adultery "form a pattern so deeply pressed into the
substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon
that basis." Id.
68. 381 U.S. 479, 480, 485-86 (1965).
69. Id. at 484 (noting that zones of privacy are created by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
70. Id. at 486; see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding that a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
violates the Equal Protection Clause).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
72. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
73. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 557 (1st ed. 1994).
74. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
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the times."" Justice Black argued that the makers of the Consti-
tution saw a need for revision and provided for it in the Article V
amendment procedures.7 ' He further opined that this method of
change was "good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-
fashioned I must add it is good enough for me.""
Loving v. Virginia considered the right of different-race couples
to marry. Virginia law prohibited and criminalized only interra-
cial marriages involving white persons.7 ' The state argued that its
law was grounded in the contention that "for over 100 years, since
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, numerous states-as
late as 1956, the majority of the states-and now even 16 states,
have been exercising [the] power [to prohibit interracial marriag-
es] without any question being raised as to the authority of the
state to exercise this power."" Striking down this tradition-based
antimiscegenation -statute, a unanimous Court held that Virgin-
ia's law, "designed to maintain White Supremacy," prohibited
"generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different
races."" Delivering the opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl
Warren wrote, "The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men."82 He added that "[u]nder our Constitu-
tion, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the
State.""
C. The 1970s
Roe v. Wade contained references to tradition and the Court
held that a Texas anti-abortion statute was unconstitutional.8 4
75. Id. at 522.
76. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. V.
77. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
78. 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
79. Id. at 4-5 & nn.3-4.
80. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395),
reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds.,
1975).
81. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
82. Id. at 12.
83. Id.
84. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
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Justice Harry Blackmun's opinion for the Court, concluding that
the abortion right was not traditionally proscribed, examined
"[a]ncient attitudes," the origins of the Hippocratic Oath, common
law, English statutory law, and the laws of the states." A wom-
an's choice to terminate a pregnancy "was present in this country
well into the 19th century," Justice Blackmun wrote, and "[e]ven
later, the law continued for some time to treat less punitively an
abortion procured in early pregnancy.""
Justice William Rehnquist presented a different understanding
of tradition. He argued that a half-century of abortion restrictions
in a majority of the states was "a strong indication. . . that the
asserted right to an abortion is not 'so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.""' Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted that at least thirty-six state or territorial
laws limited abortion in 1868, the year of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment; that the laws of twenty-one states in ef-
fect in 1868 were still in effect at the time of the Court's decision
in Roe; and that the Texas law that the Court reviewed was first
enacted in 1857 and was essentially the same law that the Roe
Court invalidated ." In Rehnquist's view, the asserted right to an
abortion was not a deeply rooted tradition and the state's prohibi-
tion was constitutional."
Family and tradition were discussed in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland." Inez Moore, a woman who lived in her East Cleve-
land home with her son and two grandsons (the grandsons were
first cousins, not brothers), challenged a city ordinance limiting
the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a nuclear family.91
The Court struck down the ordinance." Justice Lewis Powell, Jr.'s
plurality opinion noted that defining the scope and reach of the
Due Process Clause "has at times been a treacherous field for this
Court" and a cause "for concern lest the only limits to . . . judicial
intervention become the predilections of those who happen . .. to
85. Id. at 130-41.
86. Id. at 140-41.
87. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934)).
88. See id. at 174-77.
89. Id.
90. 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
91. Id. at 495-96.
92. Id. at 506.
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be Members of this Court."93 He grounded the opinion in his un-
derstanding of the tradition and history of the family, a tradition
including the nuclear family as well as "uncles, aunts, cousins,
and especially grandparents sharing a household." As extended
family households were part of the nation's traditions, the city
could not constitutionally standardize children and adults by forc-
ing them to dwell in narrowly defined family units."
In his dissent, Justice Byron Raymond White criticized Justice
Powell's approach as suggesting "a far too expansive charter ....
What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is arguable,
which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process Clause is
even more debatable."" Justice White warned that the plurality's
analysis would unduly broaden the scope of substantive due pro-
cess review:
The Judiciary, including this Court, is the most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made consti-
tutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present con-
struction of the Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss
on its terms, as well as on the anticipation of the Framers, . . . the
Court should be extremely reluctant to breathe still further substan-
tive content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike down legisla-
tion adopted by a State or city to promote its welfare. Whenever the
Judiciary does so, it unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part of
the Xovernance of the country without express constitutional author-
ity.
The Court identified pertinent and operative traditions as it
decided substantive due process cases brought by plaintiffs claim-
ing that certain state actions had unconstitutionally infringed
upon their liberty interests." The traditions of purported black in-
feriority and the supposed domesticity of women founded in the
divine ordinance were referenced and given constitutional signifi-
cance in Court decisions that validated rank and overt govern-
93. Id. at 502 (plurality opinion).
94. Id. at 504.
95. Id. at 505-06. Justice Stevens' concurrence provided the fifth vote for the Court's
judgment.
96. Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 544.
98. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-87, 795 (1983) (discussing the
Judeo-Christian tradition of legislative prayer).
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mental discrimination." Criminal defendants' invocations of con-
stitutional protections were rejected on tradition-based grounds,
while tradition supported the claims of parents seeking freedom
from state interference with certain educational and parental de-
cision matters."o Disagreements between Justices as to whether
and how tradition should be considered and employed can be seen
in Griswold's concurring and dissenting opinions, in Justice
Blackmun's and Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Roe, and in
Moore's plurality and dissenting opinions."o
In turning to tradition to resolve constitutional issues, the Jus-
tices were not restricted in their determination of (what they
deemed to be) the relevant tradition. That freedom to choose and
the discretion to identify a tradition can be outcome-influential,
and even outcome-dispositive, for 'tradition' can be invoked in
support of almost any cause" and "[t]here is obvious room to ma-
neuver, along continua of both space and time, on the subject of
which tradition to invoke."'02 As John Ely observed:
Whose traditions count? America's only? Why not the entire
world's? . . . And what is the relevant time frame? All of history? An-
teconstitutional only? Prior to the ratification of the provision whose
construction is in issue? . . . And who is to say that the "tradition"
must have been one endorsed by a majority? Is Henry David Tho-
reau an invocable part of American tradition? John Brown? John
Calhoun? Jesus Christ? It's hard to see why not. 0 3
II. TRADITIONALISM
Traditionalism refers to an analysis in which a constitutional
provision is interpreted and applied "in accordance with the long-
standing and evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the
nation."' More than just a reference to tradition, a jurist employ-
99. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (discussing the tradition of the
domesticity of women and strict gender roles); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51
(1896) (discussing the tradition of purported black inferiority in the United States).
100. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 232 (1972) (holding that Amish
children may not be compelled to attend school past the eighth grade, against their par-
ents' wishes); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923) (discussing the traditional
parental right to control a child's education, as applied to foreign languages).
101. See supra notes 68-77, 84-97 and accompanying text.
102. ELY, supra note 4, at 60.
103. Id.
104. McConnell, supra note 26, at 1133.
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ing traditionalist methodology focuses on certain aspects of the
nation's tradition and history as she looks to the past while seek-
ing answers to contemporary constitutional controversies.1 5
This part focuses on four Supreme Court decisions in which the
Justices articulated differing views on, and formulations of, due
process traditionalism.
A. Michael H. v. Gerald D.
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Court held that a California
law's presumption that a child born to a married woman was a
child of the marriage did not violate the due process rights of the
biological father of the child who was not married to the moth-
106
er.
Justice Antonin Scalia's plurality opinion stated that the pur-
pose of the Due Process Clause was to "prevent future genera-
tions from lightly casting aside important traditional values-not
to enable this Court to invent new ones."o' To limit and guide ju-
dicial interpretation of the clause, the Court had required that
the claimed liberty interest be fundamental, as well as an interest
that society has traditionally protected.' Thus, the Due Process
Clause provided only for fundamental protections deeply rooted
in American traditions.'
Justice Scalia found it inconceivable that the relationship be-
tween the biological father and the child "has been treated as a
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society,
or . . . has been accorded special protection.""10 In his view, the
tradition protecting the marital family unit from the biological fa-
ther's claim was found in the common law as indicated in a 1569
work by Henry de Bracton, in Blackstone's and Kent's respective
commentaries, and in a 1957 American Law Reports annotation
on the presumption of the legitimacy of children conceived and
105. See id. (finding that traditionalism requires courts to preserve continuity with the
past when interpreting the Constitution).
106. 491 U.S. 110, 124-27 (1989).
107. Id. at 122 n.2 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 122.
109. Id.; see also id. at 123 (noting the "insistence that the asserted liberty interest be
rooted in history and tradition").
110. Id. at 124.
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born in wedlock."' As for the framing of the right at issue, Justice
Scalia set out the following methodology: "We refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified."" 2 Consulting
the most specific tradition was necessary because general tradi-
tions offered limited guidance and gave judges unfettered discre-
tion to shape society's views."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined by Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy, did not agree with Justice Scalia's interpretive approach."
She argued that Justice Scalia's most-specific-level analysis
"sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identify-
ing liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause . . . that
may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this ar-
ea."' The Court had previously characterized right-protecting
traditions at general levels and not necessarily at the most specif-
ic level possible.1 16 Noting with approval Justice Harlan's tradi-
tionalist approach in Poe v. Ullman, Justice O'Connor declined to
"foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single
mode of historical analysis.""'
Justice William Brennan, Jr. also critiqued Justice Scalia's ap-
proach. Tradition "can be as malleable and as elusive as 'liberty'
itself," and in looking for "an interest 'deeply rooted in the coun-
try's traditions' . . . [he] would not stop . .. at Bracton, or Black-
stone, or Kent, or even the American Law Reports" in conducting
his search."' In recognizing that tradition was relevant to the
Court's previous rulings in cases involving marriage, childbear-
ing, childrearing, and other practices and interests, Justice Bren-
nan stated that "the Due Process Clause would seem an empty
promise if it did not protect them.""' But he objected to Justice
111. See id. at 124-26.
112. Id. at 127-28 n.6.
113. Id. at 128 n.6. For an excellent discussion and critique of Justice Scalia's Michael
H. analysis, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Defini-
tion of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1085-98 (1990).
114. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
115. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972)); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
116. Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967)).
117. Id.; see also supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
118. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 139; see also supra Part I.
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Scalia acting "as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is
to confirm the importance of interests already protected by a ma-
jority of the States. Transforming the protection afforded by the
Due Process Clause into a redundancy mocks those who, with
care and purpose, wrote the Fourteenth Amendment."12 Pro-
claiming that "[w]e are not an assimilative, homogeneous society,
but a facilitative, pluralistic one," 2' Justice Brennan stated:
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me.
It is not the living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it
is instead a stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the
prejudices and superstitions of a time long past. This Constitution
does not recognize that times change, does not see that sometimes a
practice or rule outlives its foundations. I cannot accept an interpre-
tive method that does such violence to the charter that I am bound
by oath to uphold.12
B. Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health
Whether Nancy Beth Cruzan, a patient in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, had a due process "right under the United States Con-
stitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-
sustaining treatment" was the question addressed by the Court in
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health."2 More specifically, the
Court asked whether the Constitution prohibited Missouri's pro-
cedural requirement that an incompetent person's wishes regard-
ing the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment be proved by clear
and convincing evidence.'
Speaking for the Court and upholding the state's evidentiary
requirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that a state is not
"required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and volun-
tary decision by a physically able adult to starve to death."12 ' The
state "may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of
this choice through the imposition of heightened evidentiary re-
quirements."16 Recognizing the substantiality of the individual
120. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41.
121. Id. at 141.
122. Id.
123. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266, 269 (1990).
124. Id. at 280.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 281.
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and societal interests in this area, the Chief Justice determined
that the state "may permissibly place an increased risk of an er-
roneous decision on those seeking to terminate an incompetent
individual's life-sustaining treatment."
Unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, Justice
Scalia's concurrence turned to tradition. Justice Scalia argued
that a claimant seeking to maintain a substantive due process
claim must demonstrate "that the State has deprived him of a
right historically and traditionally protected against state inter-
ference."128 Referencing English common law, criminal law at the
time of the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
other developments, he concluded that "there is no significant
support for the claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in our
tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."" 9
The dissenting Justices also relied on references to tradition,
albeit ones different from that identified by Justice Scalia. Justice
Brennan argued that "[t]he right to be free from medical atten-
tion without consent, to determine what shall be done with one's
own body, is deeply rooted in this Nation's traditions."' Further,
Justice Stevens stated:
Our duty, and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the
conditions of our own mortality are undoubtedly "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal" and indeed are essential incidents of the unalienable rights to
131life and liberty endowed us by our Creator.
C. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
The Justices continued their debate over whether and how due
process traditionalism should be employed in Planned
127. Id. at 283.
128. Id. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122
(1989)).
129. Id. at 294-95 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)) (internal
quotations omitted).
130. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934)) (explaining further that "[o]ur ethical tradition has long regarded an apprecia-
tion of mortality as essential to understanding life's significance").
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.132 Reaffirming
the central holding of Roe v. Wade"' in their joint and plurality
opinion, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter stated that "[i]t
is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judg-
es, . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those
practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected
against government interference by other rules of law when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.""" Resisting that tempta-
tion, the plurality opined: "Neither the Bill of Rights nor the spe-
cific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive
sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects."3 5
Citing Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe, the joint opinion stated
that "[t]he inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due
process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Con-
stitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts
always have exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not
susceptible of expression as a simple rule."'
In addition, the joint opinion declared that the Court's "obliga-
tion is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate [its] own moral
code."' 7 Liberty involves "the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy."' It includes "the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion
of the State."'39
132. 505 U.S. 833, 980-81 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the joint
opinion's position regarding the constitutional protection of liberty).
133. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973) (holding that before viabil-
ity, a woman has the right to obtain an abortion without undue interference from the
state, and that after viability, the state may regulate abortions except in cases to preserve
the life or health of the mother).
134. Casey, 505 U.S. at 843-47. Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun both concurred
in part. Id. at 911, 922.
135. Id. at 848.
136. Id. at 849; see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
137. Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.




Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia, and
Thomas, expressed his belief that Poe "can and should be over-
ruled" because it was incorrectly decided.' He noted that abor-
tion after "quickening" was a common law offense and that in
1868, abortion was prohibited by law in twenty-eight of the thir-
ty-seven states and eight territories; was prohibited or restricted
by nearly all of the states at the beginning of the twentieth centu-
ry; and was proscribed by twenty-one laws in effect in 1973, the
year of the Roe decision."' He concluded, "On this record, it can
scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively un-
restricted abortion in our history supported the classification of
the right to abortion as 'fundamental' under the Due Process
Clause.""
Writing separately, Justice Scalia opined that the issue before
the Court was "not whether the power of a woman to abort her
unborn child is a 'liberty' in the absolute sense; or even whether it
is a liberty of great importance to many women. Of course it is
both.""' Rather, for Justice Scalia, the question was whether the
power of a woman to abort her unborn child was a constitutional-
ly protected liberty, to which the answer was an emphatic "no."'"
He reached that conclusion for two reasons: "(1) the Constitution
says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding tradi-
tions of American society have permitted it to be legally pro-
scribed.""
D. Washington v. Glucksberg
Unable to convince a majority of the Court to adopt the tradi-
tionalist analysis set out in his Casey dissent,146 Chief Justice
Rehnquist secured five votes, including Justice O'Connor's, and
140. Id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
141. See id. at 952.
142. Id. at 952-53. Justice Blackmun criticized the Chief Justice's "stunted conception
of individual liberty" and "exclusive reliance on tradition as a source of fundamental
rights." Id. at 940 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
143. Id. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 944.
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wrote for the majority in Washington v. Glucksberg.14 ' In that case
the plaintiffs contended that the liberty interest of the Due Pro-
cess Clause extended to and protected the "liberty of competent,
terminally ill adults to make end-of-life decisions free of undue
government interference."" Not accepting this framing of the is-
sue, Chief Justice Rehnquist asked whether the protections that
the Due Process Clause provides included a right to assisted sui-
cide.'4 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist set out the two elements of the sub-
stantive due process analysis:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause spe-
cially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, ob-
jectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," . . .
and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." Second, we
have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful descrip-
tion" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.
As for history and tradition, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
assisted suicide is a crime in most states and in most western
democracies."' He cited Bracton's treatise and Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England to support the proposition
that suicide and assisted suicide were punished under "the Anglo-
American common-law tradition.""2 Chief Justice Rehnquist stat-
ed that this view was adopted by the American colonies and early
state legislatures and courts, and that by the time of the Four-
teenth Amendment's adoption, assisted suicide was illegal in al-
most every state."' In addition, a 1980 version of the Model Penal
Code prohibited such conduct, and the ban was generally reaf-
firmed by voters and legislatures."4
Employing a restrained methodology, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the asserted right to assisted suicide found no
147. 521 U.S. 702, 704 (1997).
148. Id. at 724 (quoting Brief of Respondents at 10, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708925).
149. Id. at 724.
150. Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
151. Id. at 710.
152. Id. at 711-12.
153. Id. at 715.
154. Id. at 715-16.
600 [Vol. 49:579
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
support in the nation's traditions.' 5 The "consistent and almost
universal tradition ... has long rejected the asserted right, and
continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, men-
tally competent adults.""' Accordingly, assisted suicide is not a
fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause.1 5 1
As Randy Barnett has noted, the first step of the "Glucksberg
Two-Step"' (a step borrowed from Bowers v. Hardwick)"' does
not indicate whether a right has "to be both deeply rooted in tra-
dition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, or just one or
the other[.] . . . Perhaps most importantly, does a liberty need to
have been legally protected in our traditions or merely tradition-
ally unregulated?"' Glucksberg's second step, requiring a careful
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest, is prob-
lematic given that a particular liberty can be accurately defined
in various ways.6 6 Barnett notes that in the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Raich v. Gonzales,'6 2 the plaintiff argued that she had a
fundamental right to use cannabis "to preserve her life. If any
right is fundamental, this would surely seem to be."' 3 The gov-
155. Id. at 723. A restrained methodology "tends to rein in the subjective elements that
are necessarily present in due process judicial review" and "avoids the need for complex
balancing of competing interests in every case." Id. at 722.
156. Id. at 723.
157. Id. at 728; see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997) (holding that the
New York statute prohibiting assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
158. Barnett, supra note 20, at 1488-89.
159. 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986). For more on Glucksberg's reliance on Bowers, see
Neal Devins, Ideological Cohesion and Precedent (Or Why the Court Only Cares About
Precedent When Most Justices Agree with Each Other), 86 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1410 (2008);
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 465 n.565 (2011).
160. Barnett, supra note 20, at 1489.
161. Id.
162. 500 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2007). In this case, Angel McClary Raich, diagnosed with
several serious medical conditions, contended that she had a constitutionally protected
right to use medicinal marijuana and "a fundamental right to 'mak[e] life-shaping medical
decisions that are necessary to preserve the integrity of her body, avoid intolerable physi-
cal pain, and preserve her life."' Id. at 855, 864. Not agreeing with Raich's framing, the
court reframed and narrowed the question before it as "whether the liberty interest spe-
cially protected by the Due Process Clause embraces a right to make a life-shaping deci-
sion on a physician's advice to use medical marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid
intolerable pain, and preserve life, when all other prescribed medications and remedies
have failed." Id. at 864. Having added "the centerpiece-the use of marijuana-to Raich's
proposed right," the court concluded that its framing of the claimed fundamental right was
not deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and was not "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." Id. at 864, 866. The Court concluded, "[flor the time being, this issue
remains in 'the arena of public debate and legislative action."' Id. at 866.
163. Barnett, supra note 20, at 1489.
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ernment argued that the case involved "the right to obtain and
use marijuana, which it then denied is either implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in the nation's history or
traditions."' Making the critically important point that "the out-
come of a fundamental rights analysis turns entirely on the de-
scription of the liberty in question," Barnett states that "[t]he
dirty little secret of constitutional law is that, purely as a descrip-
tive matter," the plaintiffs and the government's framings "were
both correct," as the plaintiff was preserving her life and using
medicinal marijuana.
One could have understandably concluded that the Court
would employ Glucksberg's two-step analysis in subsequent sub-
stantive due process cases."' However, in County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, the Court did not apply that methodology, holding that a
police officer did not violate the due process guarantee by causing
the death of a suspect during a high-speed chase.' The Court's
majority applied the "shocks the conscience" test set out in Ro-
chin v. California and other cases.168 Justice Scalia noted this de-
parture from Glucksberg; he argued that the Court's decision was
a "throwback to highly subjective substantive-due-process meth-
odologies" and "resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon
Brandy, the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane of subjectivity, th'
ol' 'shocks-the-conscience' test.""' Adhering to Glucksberg and re-
fusing to "fashion a new due process right out of thin air,"7 o Jus-
tice Scalia asked not "whether the police conduct here at issue
164. Id. at 1490.
165. Id. Barnett also noted that there are several "other accurate ways of defining the
liberty: a right to use any substance that is necessary to preserve one's life, a right to take
any measures to preserve one's life, a right to use marijuana, a right to act in any way
that does not harm others, etc." Id.
166. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition,
1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 672.
167. 523 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1998).
168. Id. at 846, 855; see id. at 855-56 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997) (indicating that Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered
the Court's opinion).
169. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). He noted, "For those
unfamiliar with classical music, I note that the exemplars of excellence in the text are bor-
rowed from Cole Porter's 'You're the Top."' Id. at 861 n.1.
170. Id. at 862 (quoting Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996)).
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shocks my unelected conscience," but "whether our Nation has
traditionally protected the right respondents assert.',7
E. McDonald v. City of Chicago
A more recent example of the Court's traditionalist methodolo-
gy is found in McDonald v. City of Chicago in which the Court
asked whether the right to keep and bear arms proscribed in the
Second Amendment is included in the due process concept and
whether this right "is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liber-
ty" or is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 2
By a 5-4 vote, the Court in McDonald held that the Due Pro-
cess Clause incorporates the Second Amendment right to self-
defense that the Court recognized in District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler.171 Speaking for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. ob-
served that "[s]elf-defense is a basic right, recognized by many le-
gal systems from ancient times to the present day.""' He traced
the origins of this right from the 1689 English Bill of Rights to
Blackstone's 1765 statement that "the right to keep and bear
arms was 'one of the fundamental rights of Englishmen,"' and to
the American colonies."'7 The Court noted that "[t]he right to keep
and bear arms was considered no less fundamental by those who
drafted and ratified the Bill of Rights," with nine states adopting
their own constitutional provisions protecting the right to keep
and bear arms in the post-ratification period.'7
Shifting the focus to the 1850s and then to the years following
the Civil War, Justice Alito expressed that the efforts of the thir-
ty-ninth Congress to protect the right to keep and bear arms
manifested the fundamental nature of the right."'7  The Freed-
171. Id.
172. 561 U.S. 742, 764, 767, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3025, 3036 (2010) (quoting Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 721); see U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be in-
fringed.").
173. McDonald, id. at 767, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 768, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-37 (internal citations omitted).
176. Id., 130 S. Ct. at 3037. Those nine states joined four other states with pre-
ratification Second Amendment analogues. Id. at 769, 130 S. Ct. at 3037.
177. Id. at 771, 130 S. Ct. at 3039-40.
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men's Bureau Act of 1866 provided that "the constitutional right
to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens
... without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slav-
ery.""' This legislation responded to efforts to disarm African
Americans who had served in the Union army, as well as state
militias' attempts to take firearms from newly freed enslaved
persons."' Moreover, Justice Alito continued, the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 sought to protect citizens' right to keep and bear arms,
and debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and evidence in the
period following the 1868 ratification of that provision "only con-
firm[] that the right to keep and bear arms was considered fun-
damental.""so
Dissenting, Justice Stevens criticized Justice Alito's "mode of
intellectual history, culling selected pronouncements and enact-
ments from the 18th and 19th centuries to ascertain what Ameri-
cans thought about firearms.""' A liberty guarantee exclusively
recognizing only those rights deeply rooted in tradition would
merely "ratify those rights that state actors have already been ac-
cording the most extensive protection."'8 2 As Justice Stevens re-
marks,
That approach is unfaithful to the expansive principle Americans
laid down when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the
level of generality they chose when they crafted its language; it
promises an objectivity it cannot deliver and masks the value judg-
ments that pervade any analysis of what customs, defined in what
manner, are sufficiently "rooted"; it countenances the most revolting
injustices in the name of continuity, for we must never forget that
not only slavery but also the subjugation of women and other rank
forms of discrimination are part of our history; and it effaces this
Court's distinctive role in saying what the law is, leaving the devel-
opment and safekeeping of liberty to majoritarian political processes.
It is judicial abdication in the guise of judicial modesty.183
178. Id. at 773, 130 S. Ct. at 3040 (quoting Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866, ch. 200, §
14, 14 Stat. 173, 176-77).
179. See id. at 774-75, 130 S. Ct. at 3039-40 (discussing the efforts to disarm freed
slaves and Congress' attempts to stop this practice).
180. Id. at 776, 130 S. Ct. at 3040-41.
181. Id. at 873, 130 S. Ct. at 3097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 875, 130 S. Ct. at 3098.
183. Id. at 876, 130 S. Ct. at 3098-99; see also id. at 906, 130 S. Ct. at 3116-17 ("At
what level of generality should one frame the liberty interest in question? What does it
mean for a right to be 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'? By what
standard will that proposition be tested? Which types of sources will count, and how will
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Justice Stevens found no substantive due process case that so
much as suggests that "liberty" circumscribes either a right of
self-defense or a right to keep and bear arms.' He acknowledged
that while there might be some truth to the notion that Ameri-
cans' interest in keeping and bearing arms, and the states' recog-
nition of the interest, is a "deeply rooted" principle in some re-
spects, it is "equally true that the States have a long and
unbroken history of regulating firearms."'" State restrictions on
the right to keep and bear arms "short of complete disarmament
is, in fact, far more entrenched than the notion that the Federal
Constitution protects any such right. "Federalism is a far 'older
and more deeply rooted tradition than is a right to carry,' or to
own, 'any particular kind of weapon.""
In a separate dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer expressed his
concern about "the reefs and shoals that lie in wait for those non-
expert judges who place virtually determinative weight upon his-
torical considerations."' He argued that the Court should look to
other factors as well as history, including "the basic values that
underlie a constitutional provision and their contemporary signif-
icance" as well as "the relevant consequences and practical justi-
fications that might, or might not, warrant removing an im-
portant question from the democratic decisionmaking process."'
With regard to the issue before the Court, Justice Breyer re-
marked that the question was "not whether there are references
to the right to bear arms for self-defense throughout this Nation's
history-of course there are-or even whether the Court should
incorporate a simple constitutional requirement that firearms
regulations not unreasonably burden the right to keep and bear
arms."' Rather, the question is "whether there is a consensus
that so substantial a private self-defense right as the one de-
scribed in Heller applies to the States."'' Surveying. the historical
record, he rejected the notion that the right to bear arms for self-
those sources be weighed and aggregated? There is no objective, neutral answer to these
questions. There is not even a theory ... of how to go about answering them." (internal
citations omitted)).
184. Id. at 893, 130 S. Ct. at 3109.
185. Id. at 899, 130 S. Ct. at 3112.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 916, 130 S. Ct. at 3122 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 930, 130 S. Ct. at 3130.
190. Id.
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defense is fundamental. Justice Breyer wrote that the evidence
showed that both states and municipalities have consistently
regulated firearms throughout American history and that courts
have likewise consistently upheld these regulations."' That rec-
ord did not support the majority's conclusion that the right to
keep and bear arms is deeply rooted in American history and tra-
dition.192
The Court's decisions discussed in this part are important ex-
emplars of due process traditionalism and different variations
and applications of the methodology. In Michael H., a majority of
the Court did not adopt Justice Scalia's call for deciding substan-
tive due process cases by reference to the most specific level at
which a tradition protecting or denying an asserted right could be
identified.'93 Cruzan's validation of Missouri's procedural re-
quirement governing an incompetent person's wishes regarding
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment did not follow a tradi-
tionalist analysis; references to and reliance on various traditions
were made in the concurring and dissenting opinions. 94 In Casey,
a Court majority did not agree with the proposition that the con-
stitutionally protected sphere of liberty was limited to the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights or those practices protected when the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.195 And in Glucks-
berg, the Court, adopting a purportedly objective traditionalist
approach, declared that the Due Process Clause protects only
those carefully described fundamental rights and liberties which
were deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' That traditionalist and
historical approach guided the five-Justice majority's incorpora-
tion analysis in McDonald.197
191. Id. at 931, 130 S. Ct. at 3131.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 147-57 and accompanying text. As Katharine Bartlett has ob-
served, "tradition does not provide an objective basis for deciding substantive due process
claims.... Tradition is not fixed, nor can it be easily or reliably retrieved. It represents
not fixed facts, but accumulated values that cannot be ascertained through some precise,
scientific method." Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive
Due Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 545 (2012).
197. See supra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
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Does Glucksberg, coming as it does after Casey and followed in
McDonald, set forth the controlling traditionalist analysis to be
applied in substantive due process cases, including cases chal-
lenging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation? As dis-
cussed in the next part, the Court has answered this question dif-
ferently.
III. TRADITIONALISM AND THE COURT'S SEXUAL ORIENTATION
JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court considered substantive due process chal-
lenges to laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
in three cases. As discussed in this part, a deeply divided Court
issued decisions upholding one and striking down two of the chal-
lenged laws, with the Justices formulating and applying different
traditionalist methodologies.
A. State Criminalization of Same-Sex Sexual Intimacy
1. Bowers v. Hardwick
Bowers v. Hardwick'" rejected a due process challenge to a
Georgia statute providing that "[a] person commits the offense of
sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act in-
volving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of an-
other."'" Writing for a five-Justice majority,200 Justice White
framed the issue before the Court as "whether the Federal Con-
stitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to en-
gage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time."2 0'
198. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
199. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)(1) (2011); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189. Persons convicted of
violating this law were subject to imprisonment of not less than one or more than twenty
years. § 16-6-2(b)(1);.
200. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187. Justice Powell, one of the five votes upholding the Geor-
gia statute, later stated that he "probably made a mistake" when he voted with the Bowers
majority. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 530 (1994).
201. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. This framing of the issue is "somewhat problematical,
because the statute on its face applied to all forms of sodomy, heterosexual as well as ho-
mosexual." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 117 (1990).
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Asking the question in that way answers it. Justice White de-
termined that there was no "fundamental right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy" because sodomy proscriptions are derived from
ancient roots and because sodomy was a common-law criminal of-
fense "forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they
ratified the Bill of Rights" in 1791.202 He noted that when the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, only five of the
thirty-seven existing states did not criminalize sodomy. He also
pointed out that "until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and
today, 24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide
criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and between
consenting adults."2 03 Given this history, Justice White concluded
that any claim that the right to engage in sodomy was "deeply
rooted in th[e] Nation's history and tradition," or otherwise inher-
ent in the notion of ordered liberty, would be facetious at best.2 04
Justice Blackmun's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, rejected Justice White's framing of the is-
sue.205 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the case was not about the
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, but was instead concerned
with the right to be left alone, free from exposure to criminal
sanctions enforced against homosexuals but not heterosexuals.206
He also rejected the proposition that "either the length of time a
majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it de-
fends them can withdraw legislation from this Court's scruti-
ny."o' Further, Justice Blackman noted that
"[iut is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." I be-
lieve we must analyze respondent Hardwick's claim in the light of
the values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. If that
right means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute
its citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of
202. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92.
203. Id. at 193-94.
204. Id. at 194.
205. See id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 199-200.
207. Id. at 210.
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their lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have
made is an "abominable crime not fit to be named among Chris-
.,,20stians.
Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's
traditional-therefore-constitutional analysis that "the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a par-
ticular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for uphold-
ing a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional
attack."2 09 Justice Stevens looked to a tradition different from that
identified by Justice White. He explained, "Guided by history, our
tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters
of conscience and the restraints implicit in the federal system,
federal judges have accepted the responsibility for recognition
and protection of these rights in appropriate cases."21 While soci-
ety has a right to encourage individuals to adhere to certain tra-
ditions in matters involving affection and gratification, liberty
"surely embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual
conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral.""
Criticized as presenting a "flat and disdainful" review of the
historical record, Bowers illustrates the critical importance of the
Court's identification and articulation of what a majority of the
Justices deemed to be the pertinent tradition by which the consti-
tutionality of an at-issue state law is to be evaluated.212 The Court
gave operational effect to certain historical practices and markers
and employed a count-the-states approach as it validated Geor-
gia's criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct.212 Interestingly,
and tellingly, its reliance on (and its understanding of) traditional
prohibitions of sodomy was flawed. As Richard Posner has noted,
common law sodomy was limited to anal intercourse and did not
include fellatio, the conduct for which Michael Hardwick was ar-
208. Id. at 199-200 (quoting Herring v. State, 46 S.E. 876, 882 (Ga. 1904)); Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)).
209. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 217 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 720 (7th Cir.
1975)) (internal quotations omitted).
211. Id. at 217-18.
212. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARv. L. REV. 4, 90 (2003).
213. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94.
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rested.1 The classification of oral sex as proscribed sodomy oc-
curred in the late nineteenth century, long after the ratification of
the Bill of Rights and subsequent to the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment.2 15
2. Lawrence v. Texas
Bowers was reexamined in Lawrence v. Texas,216 wherein the
Court considered the constitutionality of a Texas statute crimi-
nalizing "deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex."217 By a 5-4 vote, the Court concluded that the stat-
ute violated the Due Process Clause.1
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court opened with the follow-
ing paragraph:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intru-
sions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of
our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should
not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom
of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The in-
stant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its
219
more transcendent dimensions.
214. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 343 (1992).
215. Id.
216. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
217. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1994).
218. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558, 561, 578. Justice Kennedy did not decide the case on
equal protection grounds. He noted, "Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn dif-
ferently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex partici-
pants." Id. at 575. Interestingly, he did state that both "[e]quality of treatment and the
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of
liberty are linked in important respects" as the criminalization of same-sex sexual conduct
"in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in
the public and in the private spheres." Id. This language "sounds almost entirely in equal
protection." Post, supra note 212, at 99.
Justice O'Connor, declining to overrule Bowers, analyzed the case under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. She found an equal protection violation in the Texas law's differential
treatment of same-sex deviate sexual intercourse, which was criminalized, and different-
sex deviate sexual intercourse, which was not. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579, 581 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in judgment).
219. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
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He then framed the issue before the Court as "whether the pe-
titioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in
the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause."20 Re-
call that the Bowers Court asked whether the Constitution "con-
fers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodo-
,,221
my. In Justice Kennedy's view, the Bowers framing revealed
the Court's failure to consider the scope of the liberty at issue.222
Justice Kennedy explained that "[t]o say that the issue in Bowers
was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans
the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the
right to have sexual intercourse."2
Reconsidering Bowers, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the
Court's 1986 view that anti-sodomy laws have "ancient roots."24
He did not find a "longstanding history in this country of laws di-
rected at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter," because early
sodomy laws were instead directed at prohibiting nonprocreative
sexual conduct generally and were not specifically targeted at
homosexuals.12 ' Applying a desuetude analysis, 226 he reasoned
that the absence of enforcement of anti-sodomy laws against con-
senting adults who engaged in such conduct in private was signif-
icant; the infrequency of prosecutions questions the legitimacy of
the notion that society endorsed "rigorous and systematic pun-
ishment" of persons engaging in same-sex intimate conduct.22 7
Moreover, Justice Kennedy continued, states did not target same-
sex sodomy until the last third of the twentieth century, and state
laws criminalizing such conduct did not occur prior to the 1970s,
220. Id. at 564; see also JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY:
RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 266 (2013) (noting that Justice Kennedy
"frame[d] the right asserted quite abstractly").
221. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
222. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
223. Id.
224. Id.; see supra note 202 and accompanying text.
225. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568.
226. The desuetude doctrine "forbids the use of old laws lacking current public support,
to require more in the way of accountability and deliberation." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1999).
227. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569-70. Disagreeing with Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia
argued that "it is entirely unsurprising that evidence of enforcement would be hard to
come by" where sexual activity occurs "on private premises with the doors closed and win-
dows covered." Id. at 597 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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with only nine states doing so at the time of the Court's deci-
228
s1on.
Having questioned Bowers' traditionalist analysis, Justice
Kennedy made clear that history and tradition "are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry."229 Significantly, he did not look back to colonial
times or to 1791 or 1868. He identified, instead, American laws
and traditions in the last fifty years as the relevant time period,
and found there to be "an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex."2"o Looking beyond
the United States and to a broader civilization, Justice Kennedy
explained that Bowers had been rejected in decisions by the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights23 ' and noted that "[o]ther na-
tions.. . have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, con-
sensual conduct."2  Noting that the Casey and Romer decisions
had deeply eroded the foundations of Bowers, Justice Kennedy
overruled Bowers, concluding that it was decided incorrectly and
should therefore not remain binding precedent."
Making clear the limits of Lawrence, Justice Kennedy pointed
out that the case did not involve minors, "persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where con-
sent might not easily be refused," or "public conduct or prostitu-
tion."2 " Nor did the case address formal governmental recognition
of homosexual relationships.23 5 Lawrence involved two adults who
228. Id. at 570 (majority opinion).
229. Id. at 572.
230. Id. at 571-72.
231. Id. at 576 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981)).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 576, 578; see supra notes 132-42 and accompanying text. In Romer v. Evans,
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that the Equal Protection Clause was
violated by a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting state or local antidiscrimina-
tion laws, policies, or actions protecting gays, lesbians, or bisexuals. 517 U.S. 620, 634-36
(1996). The Court concluded that the amendment was not rationally related to a legiti-
mate government purpose as it was "born of animosity toward the class of persons affect-
ed," was "a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could
discern a relationship to legitimate state interests," and was "a classification of persons
undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit." Id.
at 634-35.




consensually "engaged in sexual practices common to a homosex-
ual lifestyle;" they were "entitled to respect for their private
lives," lives that should not be demeaned by the criminalization of
their private behavior under a law furthering "no legitimate state
interest which can justify [the state's] intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual."2 36
Justice Kennedy closed his opinion with an unmistakably for-
ward-looking approach to the Due Process Clause:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the compo-
nents of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been
more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew
times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to op-
press. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.2 37
Dissenting, Justice Scalia adhered to Bowers and applied the
traditionalist analysis set forth in Washington v. Glucksberg.238
He argued that the right to engage in homosexual sodomy was
not fundamental and that Justice Kennedy erred in concluding
that there was no longstanding tradition of legal proscriptions of
that conduct.239 Bowers referred to an established tradition of
"prohibiting sodomy in general," whether performed by same-sex
or different-sex couples.240 Whether the law criminalized homo-
sexuals in particular or homosexuals or heterosexuals generally
was irrelevant, as under either view the prohibition of sodomy ex-
cluded that conduct from those rights "deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition."241 As for the majority's "emerging
awareness" analysis and focus on the past half-century, Justice
Scalia urged that "an 'emerging awareness' is by definition not
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[s]' and that
"[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence because
236. Id.
237. Id. at 578-79.
238. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
239. Id. at 588, 594-596; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Bow-
ers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986); see also supra Part II.D.
240. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 596.
241. Id. (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192).
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some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on
certain behavior."2 42
For Justice Scalia, the Court's decision had implications for the
same-sex marriage issue. In his view, the Court's opinion "dis-
mantle[d] the structure of constitutional law that ha[d] permitted
a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual
unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned." 243
Asking "what justification [there could] possibly be for denying
the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising '[t]he
liberty protected by the Constitution"' in light of the Court's deci-
sion, he opined that encouraging procreation was not such a justi-
* ,,244fication "since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.
The case before the Court did not involve same-sex marriage "on-
ly if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have noth-
ing to do with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as
the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so."245
Lawrence repudiated the particular form of traditionalism em-
ployed in Bowers-and, one could argue, precedential support for
the deeply rootedlimplicit-in-ordered-liberty step of the Glucks-
berg analysis.24 ' Looking for a current-day answer to the question
of the constitutionality of same-sex intimate conduct, Lawrence's
''emerging awareness" analysis looked back for the principles of
liberty as understood by more recent generations rather than
looking as far back as the Glucksberg approach-the laws of the
thirteen states at the time of the 1791 ratification of the Bill of
Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment as adopted in 1868, etc.247
Formally interring Bowers, the Court made clear that the due
process rights of current generations are not restricted to or
bound by long past views regarding the legality of same-sex sexu-
al intimacy, and it squarely rejected the proposition that the gov-
ernment's traditional and historical proscription of this conduct
provides constitutional grounds for its prohibition.24 8
242. Id. at 597-98.
243. Id. at 604.
244. Id. at 605.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 572, 576 (majority opinion); see supra note 159 and accompanying text.
247. Compare Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72, 579 (looking back at the past half centu-
ry), with Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1997) (looking back at the past
700 years).
248. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
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B. The DOMA Decision
In 2013, exactly ten years after its decision in Lawrence, the
Court issued its much-anticipated ruling in United States v.
Windsor in which the Court considered a due process challenge to
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)."' Section 3
provides that the term "marriage" in the United States Code
''means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."250
This DOMA provision was challenged by Edith Windsor, a New
York resident who married Thea Spyer in Ontario, Canada, in
2007 and lived with Spyer in New York City.' New York deemed
the marriage to be valid as New York state law recognizes mar-
riages performed in other jurisdictions and permits same-sex
marriages.252 Spyer died in 2009, leaving her estate to Windsor,
but because of DOMA, Windsor was not considered a surviving
spouse qualifying for the marital exemption from the federal es-
tate tax.253 She paid $363,053 in estate taxes and filed a refund
suit against the federal government, alleging that DOMA's defini-
tion of marriage unconstitutionally deprived her of the liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.25 4
In yet another 5-4 decision, the Court, per Justice Kennedy,
held that DOMA Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause.255
Confining the opinion and holding to same-sex marriages recog-
nized by state laws, Justice Kennedy concluded that DOMA was
"motivated by an improper animus or purpose," that is, "the prin-
cipal purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean
those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage."256 DOMA's
249. 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2693 (2013).
250. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012).
251. Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
252. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
253. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
254. See id._, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
255. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Ginsberg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2681.
256. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2695-96. DOMA violates basic due process and
equal protection principles applicable to the federal government; and "[t]he Constitution's
guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group." Id.
at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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"avowed purpose and practical effect ... are to impose a disad-
vantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter in-
to same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authori-
ty of the States."257
Justice Kennedy argued that DOMA's history of enactment and
statutory text demonstrate "interference with the equal dignity of
same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the ex-
ercise of their sovereign power."2 58 The principal effect of DOMA
"is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make
them unequal."259 The law creates
two contradictory marriage regimes within the same State [and]
DOMA forces same-sex couples to live as married for the purpose of
state law but unmarried for the purpose of federal law, thus dimin-
ishing the stability and predictability of basic personal relations the
State has found it proper to acknowledge and protect.2 6 0
Furthermore, in treating same-sex marriage as second-tier,
DONA "humiliates tens of thousands of children now being
raised by same-sex couples."26'
What role did tradition and history play in the Court's decision
and analysis? Justice Kennedy noted that
until recent years, many citizens had not even considered the possi-
bility that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the
same status and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful mar-
riage. For marriage between a man and a woman no doubt had been
thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that
term and to its role and function throughout the history of civiliza-
tion. That belief, for many who long have held it, became even more
urgent, more cherished when challenged. For others, however, came
262
the beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight.
Justice Kennedy observed that both historically and tradition-
ally, the definition and the regulation of marriage have fallen un-
263der the control of the individual states. State authority in this
area "dates to the Nation's beginning; for 'when the Constitution
257. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
258. Id.
259. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
260. Id.
261. Id.; see also id. at ,_ 133 S. Ct. at 2695 (discussing the financial harm DOMA
has caused to children of same-sex couples).
262. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2689.
263. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2689-90.
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was adopted the common understanding was that the domestic
relations of husband and wife and parent and child were matters
reserved to the States."'26 4 While this power and authority must
be exercised in ways that respect a person's constitutional rights,
the "'regulation of domestic relations' is 'an area that has long
been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States."'"
DOVA's federal definition of marriage thus departed from "tradi-
tions of family localism."
Having focused on the states' sovereign power and virtually ex-
clusive authority to define and regulate marriage, Justice Kenne-
dy ultimately determined that it was unnecessary to decide
whether DOMA's "federal intrusion on state power is a violation
of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal balance. The
State's power in defining the marital relation is of central rele-
vance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism."2 67
New York's decision to recognize and allow same-sex marriages
conferred upon same-sex couples "a dignity and status of im-
mense import" and "enhanced the recognition, dignity, and pro-
tection of the class in their own community. DOIA, because of its
reach and extent, departs from this history and tradition of reli-
ance on state law to define marriage."2 In giving the "lawful con-
duct" of same-sex couples seeking to marry a "lawful status," New
York's law "reflects both the community's considered perspective
on the historical roots of the institution of marriage and its evolv-
ing understanding of the meaning of equality."26 9
A dissenting Justice Scalia, speaking for himself, Justice
Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts, complained that Justice Ken-
nedy "does not argue that same-sex marriage is 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition,' a claim that would of course
be quite absurd. So would the further suggestion ... that a world
264. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379,
383-84 (1930)).
265. Id. (quoting Sosna v. Iowa 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). That the definition and regu-
lation of marriage is a state matter does not mean that the federal government cannot
regulate marriage in furtherance of federal policy. Justice Kennedy noted that Congress
"can make determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges" and in doing so "has
deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations." Id. at _, 133 S.
Ct. at 2690-91.
266. Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARv. L. REV. 1, 87-88 (2013).
267. Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
268. Id.
269. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
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in which DOMA exists is one bereft of 'ordered liberty."'2 70 Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, the Constitution does not forbid governmen-
tal enforcement of traditional moral and sexual norms, and the
Constitution "neither requires nor forbids our society to approve
of same-sex marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us
to approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of
alcohol.""'
Responding to Justice Kennedy's conclusion that the motiva-
tion for DONIA was to demean and stigmatize same-sex couples,
Justice Scalia stated that "to defend traditional marriage is not to
condemn, demean, or humiliate those who would prefer other ar-
rangements, any more than to defend the Constitution of the
United States is to condemn, demean, or humiliate other consti-
tutions. To hurl such accusations so casually demeans this insti-
tution."' In his view, DOMIA does nothing "more than codify an
aspect of marriage that had been unquestioned in our society for
most of its existence-indeed, had been unquestioned in virtually
all societies for virtually all of human history."2 7'
Not believing Justice Kennedy's confinement of the Court's
opinion and holding to state-sanctioned same-sex marriages-the
"only thing that will 'confine' the Court's holding is its sense of
what it can get away with"-Justice Scalia argued that it is inevi-
table that the Court will "reach the same conclusion with regard
to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status."2 " The
Court, "which finds it so horrific that Congress irrationally and
hatefully robbed same-sex couples of the 'personhood and dignity'
which state legislatures conferred upon them, will of a certitude
be similarly appalled by state legislatures' irrational and hateful
270. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted)
(citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
271. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2707; see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878) ("Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Eu-
rope, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a fea-
ture of the life of Asiatic and of African people."); id. at 166 ("[T]here cannot be a doubt
that, unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the
power of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the
law of social life under its dominion.").
272. Windsor, 570 U.S. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).




failure to acknowledge that 'personhood and dignity' in the first
place."25 Justice Scalia added,
As far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a
matter of listening and waiting for the other shoe.
By formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an
enemy of human decency, the majority arms well every challenger to276
a state law restricting marriage to its traditional definition.
In a separate dissent, Justice Alito observed that "any 'sub-
stantive' component to the Due Process Clause protects only
'those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively,
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' . . . as well as
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liber-
ty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."2 " He continued,
It is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not deep-
ly rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. In this country, no
State permitted same-sex marriage until the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held in 2003 that limiting marriage to oppo-
site-sex couples violated the State Constitution. Nor is the right to
same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the traditions of other nations.
No country allowed same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands
did so in 2000.7
For Justice Alito, those seeking judicial validation of same-sex
marriage do not seek "the protection of a deeply rooted right but
the recognition of a very new right, and they seek this innovation
not from a legislative body elected by the people, but from une-
lected judges. Faced with such a request, judges have cause for
both caution and humility."
In Windsor, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Alito all make tradi-
tion-based arguments for their respective positions.280 Where they
differ is in the selection of the operative and governing tradition.
For Justice Kennedy and the majority, a state's authority to de-
fine and regulate marriage, a power dating back to the nation's
275. Id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2710.
276. Id.
277. Id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
278. Id. at -, 133 S. Ct. at 2715 (internal citations omitted) (citing Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003)).
279. Id.
280. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92 (majority opinion); id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at
2706-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2714-19 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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beginning, is the pertinent tradition.28 ' For Justices Scalia and
Alito the claimed right to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted
in the nation's history and tradition and therefore is not constitu-
tionally protected. 2
While Justices Scalia's and Alito's traditionalist positions
would permit prohibitions of same-sex marriage, Justice Kenne-
dy's opinion points in different directions. He speaks of two is-
sues: (1) the liberty and dignity of individuals seeking to enter in-
to same-sex marriages and the federal government's
unconstitutional interference with the equal dignity of such mar-
riages; and (2) the states' virtually exclusive authority to define
and regulate marriage."' The position Justice Kennedy ultimately
will take when he is faced with a direct clash between a liberty-
based claim to marry a person of the same sex and a state's pro-
hibition of same-sex marriages is a matter of great interest for
those seeking to invalidate or defend same-sex marriage bans.
IV. THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ISSUE
Do state-law bans on same-sex marriage violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause? Justice Scalia has argued that, in light of United
States v. Windsor, it is inevitable that the Court will strike down
laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.2 84 The accuracy of that ob-
servation will soon be known if Justice Ginsburg's recent predic-
tion that the Court will take up the issue of same-sex marriage in
2852015 or 2016 comes true.
If and when the Court takes up the same-sex marriage issue,
the Justices will address the question of whether same-sex mar-
riage is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause. As in its prior due process traditionalism cases, the
Court's framing of the inquiry will play a critical role in the anal-
ysis and adjudication of the issue. Will the Court ask and answer
281. See id. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (majority opinion).
282. See id. at _, 133 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2714-15 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
283. See id. at , 133 S. Ct. at 2691, 2694-96 (majority opinion).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 274-76.
285. German Lopez, Justice Ginsburg: Supreme Court Will Take Up Same-Sex Mar-




in the affirmative the question of whether the fundamental right
to marry encompasses same-sex marriage and subject same-sex
marriage bans to strict scrutiny judicial review? Or will the Court
instead ask and answer in the negative the question of whether
same-sex marriage is a right deeply rooted in the nation's history
and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and
therefore uphold such laws as rationally related to legitimate
state interests?
The aforesaid questions have been considered and answered by
two federal courts of appeals presented with substantive due pro-
cess challenges to anti-same-sex-marriage laws in Utah, Oklaho-
ma, and Virginia. Those courts' treatment of the same-sex mar-
riage issue provide useful exemplars of the adjudicative role that
due process traditionalism will or will not play in any future
Court ruling on this important subject.
A. A Fundamental Right To Marriage?
In two recent rulings the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit considered the constitutionality of Utah statu-
tory and constitutional provisions defining marriage as the "legal
union of a man and a woman,""' and Oklahoma's constitutional
ban on same-sex marriage.28 7
In Kitchen v. Herbert, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs challeng-
ing Utah's same-sex marriage ban.288 The court, in an opinion by
Judge Carlos Lucero, joined by Judge Jerome Holmes, asked
whether a state may "constitutionally deny a citizen the benefit
or protection of the laws of the State based solely upon the sex of
286. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.1(a) (LexisNexis 2013) ("It is the policy of this state
to recognize as marriage only the legal union of a man and a woman."); see also UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 29 ("Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a wom-
an.").
287. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35(A) (noting that marriage "shall consist only of the union
of one man and one woman. Neither this Constitution nor any other provision of law shall
be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups"); see also id. § (B)-(C) (stating that a same-sex marriage
"performed in another state shall not be recognized as valid and binding in this state" and
any person who knowingly issues a marriage license in violation of this provision is guilty
of a misdemeanor).
288. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1199-200 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 265 (2014).
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the person that citizen chooses to marry[.]"" The court answered
no, explaining that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right to mar-
ry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of
a state's marital laws. A state may not deny the issuance of a mar-
riage license to two persons, or refuse to recognize their marriage,
based solely upon the sex of the persons in the marriage union.
The state's defense of its same-sex marriage proscription war-
rants examination and comment. Utah argued that the Supreme
Court's marriage precedents established only the fundamental
right to opposite-sex marriage.291 Rejecting that argument, Judge
Lucero argued that the Court has described marriage "at a broad-
er level of generality than would be consistent with [Utah's] ar-
gument."" The court looked to Loving v. Virginia, where the is-
sue "was not whether there is a deeply rooted tradition of
interracial marriage, or whether interracial marriage is implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty; the right at issue was 'the free-
dom of choice to marry."'" In Zablocki v. Redhail, an equal pro-
tection case striking down a state law prohibiting persons with
child support arrearages from marrying, the Court held that the
law was unconstitutional given its "serious intrusion into [the]
freedom of choice in an area in which we have held such freedom
to be fundamental."29 4 As Judge Lucero noted, the right discussed
in Zablocki "was characterized as the right to marry, not as the
right of child-support debtors to marry."295 Further, in Turner v.
Safley, the Court invalidated a prison rule prohibiting inmates
from marrying absent the prison superintendent's permission.296
Judge Lucero stated that "[t]he right at issue was never framed
as 'inmate marriage'; the Court simply asked whether the fact of
incarceration made it impossible for inmates to benefit from the
'important attributes of marriage."297
289. 755 F.3d at 1198.
290. Id. at 1199.
291. Id. at 1209.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1210 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
294. 434 U.S. 374, 387, 390-91 (1978).
295. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1210.
296. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82, 96-97, 99 (1987).
297. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 95).
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Relying on Washington v. Glucksberg,298 the state also argued
that the right to same-sex marriage was not deeply rooted in the
nation's traditions because "until recent years, many citizens had
not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same
sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of
a man and woman in lawful marriage."2 " Judge Lucero rejected
the state's contention that Glucksberg's "careful description" in-
struction required the conclusion that "the term 'marriage' by its
very nature excludes same-sex couples."o00 Judge Lucero reasoned
that Glucksberg defined the scope of the claimed right independ-
ent of the identity of the right-holder, as the Court asked whether
liberty under the Due Process Clause included the right to com-
mit suicide and the right to assistance in doing so.' Accordingly,
Judge Lucero defined the claimed right to marry independent of
the sexes of the two persons seeking to marry; thus, the issue be-
fore the court concerned the right to enter into, not same-sex
marriage, but marriage."2
Judge Lucero further determined that the state's position was
foreclosed by Lawrence v. Texas."o' Recall that Lawrence overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick and rejected the Bowers Court's framing of
the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution confers a funda-
mental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence
invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such con-
duct illegal and have done so for a very long time."304 Lawrence
determined that this framing did not "appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake" and that it "misapprehended the claim of liberty
there presented."' Instead, it refrained the issue as "whether the
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in
the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause."o Not-
ing this difference in framing, Judge Lucero concluded that Law-
298. 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
299. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1209 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. , _,
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013)).
300. Id. at 1215 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
301. Id.
302. See id. at 1215-16.
303. Id. at 1217 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
304. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67, 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
190 (1986)).
305. Id. at 567.
306. Id. at 564.
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rence indicated the approach that Utah advocated to be too nar-
row and "[j]ust as it was improper to ask whether there is a right
to engage in homosexual sex, we do not ask whether there is a
right to participate in same-sex marriage."07
Judge Lucero mentioned an additional aspect of Lawrence in
his opinion. Recall Justice Kennedy's statement that "persons in
every generation can invoke [the] principles [of the Due Process
Clause] in their own search for greater freedom.""o' Articulating
his own generational analysis, Judge Lucero stated:
A generation ago, recognition of the fundamental right to marry as
applying to persons of the same sex might have been unimaginable.
A generation ago, the declaration by gay and lesbian couples of what
may have been in their hearts would have had to remain unspoken.
Not until contemporary times have laws stigmatizing or even crimi-
nalizing gay men and women been felled, allowing their relation-
ships to surface to an open society. As the district court eloquently
explained, "it is not the Constitution that has changed, but the
knowledge of what it means to be gay or lesbian." Consistent with
our constitutional tradition of recognizing the liberty of those previ-
ously excluded, we conclude that plaintiffs possess a fundamental
right to marry and to have their marriages recognized.309
This finding of fundamentality is significant, for it triggered
and subjected Utah's ban to strict scrutiny judicial review. As-
suming that the three justifications advanced by the state-all
link marriage and procreation-were compelling,1 o Judge Lucero
concluded that those interests were not narrowly tailored."
Utah's same-sex marriage prohibition did
not differentiate between procreative and non-procreative couples
[as] Utah citizens may choose a spouse of the opposite sex regardless
of the pairing's procreative capacity. The elderly, those medically
unable to conceive, and those who exercise their fundamental right
307. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1217-18.
308. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1218.
309. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1218 (internal citations omitted).
310. Id. The state argued that the definition of marriage as the legal union of one man
and one woman furthered its interests in the following ways: (1) "fostering a child-centric
marriage culture;" (2) "children being raised by their biological mothers and fathers-or at
least by a married mother and father-in a stable home;" and (3) "ensuring adequate re-
production." Id. at 1219 (internal quotations omitted). The common denominator in each of
these justifications "is the claim that allowing same-sex couples to marry 'would break the
critical conceptual link between marriage and procreation."' Id.
311. Id. at 1218-19.
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not to have biological children are free to marry and have their out-
of-state marriages recognized in Utah.312
Thus, the state "may not impinge upon the exercise of a funda-
mental right as to some, but not all, of the individuals who share
a characteristic urged to be relevant."3 13
As for the state's argument that its interest in childbearing and
childrearing is furthered by channeling procreative couples into
committed relationships, Judge Lucero did not find a sufficient
causal connection between the same-sex marriage proscription
and the state's goals.314 Rejecting the additional argument that
recognizing same-sex marriages would have drastic consequences
for Utah's opposite-sex married couples, Judge Lucero noted that
"it is wholly illogical to believe that state recognition of the love
and commitment between same-sex couples will alter the most in-
timate and personal decisions of opposite-sex couples."315
Additionally, the state urged that the same-sex marriage ban
was justified by "gendered parenting preferences" and contended
that children are parented differently by men and women."' Not
persuaded, Judge Lucero reasoned that "a prohibition on same-
sex marriage is not narrowly tailored toward the goal of encour-
aging gendered parenting styles. The state does not restrict the
right to marry or its recognition of marriage based on compliance
with any set of parenting roles, or even parenting quality."3 1 7
While every opposite-sex couple, regardless of their style of par-
enting, is allowed to marry, every same-sex couple, irrespective of
their parenting style, is prohibited from marrying."' Moreover,
noting Windsor's declaration that restricting same-sex marriage
harms the children of same-sex couples,"' Judge Lucero found
that the ban sends a damaging message to the children of same-
sex couples and that such collateral consequences imply that "the
312. Id. at 1219.
313. Id. at 1221.
314. Id. at 1222.
315. Id. at 1223; see also id. at 1224 (noting that the court could not "imagine a scenar-
io under which recognizing same-sex marriages would affect the decision of a member of
an opposite-sex couple to have a child, to marry or stay married to a partner, or to make
personal sacrifices for a child").
316. Id. at 1224.
317. Id. at 1224-25.
318. Id. at 1225.
319. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
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fit between the means and the end is insufficient to survive strict
scrutiny.""'
The state's fourth justification for the ban-the accommodation
of religious freedom and the reduction of the potential for civic
and religion-related strife-also failed as the court explained that
"public opposition cannot provide cover for a violation of funda-
mental rights."321 While same-sex couples had to "be accorded the
same legal status presently granted to married couples, . . . reli-
gious institutions remain as free as they always have been to
practice their sacraments and traditions as they see fit. . . . Our
opinion does not intrude into that domain or the exercise of reli-
gious principles in this arena.""2
In the second Tenth Circuit decision Bishop v. Smith, the same
three-judge panel that decided Kitchen struck down Oklahoma's
constitutional ban on same-sex marriage.3 23 Again writing for the
majority, Judge Lucero set forth the core holdings of both Kitchen
and Bishop: "State bans on the licensing of same-sex marriage
significantly burden the fundamental right to marry, and argu-
ments based on the procreative capacity of some opposite-sex
couples do not meet the narrow tailoring prong."2
In so holding, the court rejected the defendant court clerk's ar-
gument "that children have an interest in being raised by their
biological parents."' Assuming that that interest is compelling,
Judge Lucero concluded that "a prohibition on same-sex marriage
is not narrowly tailored to achieve that end."326 Oklahoma law al-
lows a child to be raised by persons who are not the child's biolog-
ical parents and "permits infertile opposite-sex couples to marry
despite the fact that they, as much as same-sex couples, might
320. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1226; see Franklin, supra note 23, at 878-79 ("The children of
same-sex couples are not the only ones harmed by" the message "that heterosexuality is
preferable to homosexuality. . . . Courts have observed that other children suffer as well,
as the stigma such laws perpetuate encourages '[s]chool-yard bullies' to continue 'psycho-
logically [grinding] children with apparently gay or lesbian sexual orientation in the cruel
mortar and pestle of school-yard prejudice."').
321. Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1227.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 1198; Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. de-
nied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014).
324. Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1080.




raise non-biological children."3 27 Having disregarded a child's in-
terest in being raised by her biological parents in other contexts,
the court clerk "[did] not explain why same-sex marriage poses a
unique threat such that it must be treated differently from these
other circumstances."328 Moreover, Judge Lucero noted that mem-
bers of same-sex couples, like members of opposite-sex couples,
have a constitutional right to choose not to bear or beget a child."
The court stated that "Oklahoma has barred all same-sex couples,
regardless of whether they will adopt, bear, or otherwise raise
children, from the benefits of marriage while allowing all oppo-
site-sex couples, regardless of their child-rearing decisions, to
marry."30 That "regime falls well short of establishing 'the most
exact connection between justification and classification"' and is
not narrowly tailored.3
Consider the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Bostic v.
Schaefer'12 where it held that Virginia's constitutional and statu-
tory anti-same-sex-marriage provisions" violate the Due Process
Clause.334 The plaintiffs argued that the right to marry belongs to
an individual "who enjoys the right to marry the person of his or
her choice.""' Virginia, relying on Glucksberg, contended that
"traditionally, states have sanctioned only man-woman marriag-
es" and that "in light of this history, the right to marry does not
include a right to same-sex marriage."3
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1081-82 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)).
332. See generally 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014)
(concluding "that the Virginia Marriage Laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
333. The Virginia Constitution provides "[t]hat only a union between one man and one
woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its political
subdivisions." VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A. Pursuant to a state statute, "marriage between
persons of the same sex is prohibited [and a]ny marriage entered into by persons of the
same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any
contractual rights created by such marriage shall be void and unenforceable." VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-45.2 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
334. See Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384 (finding that the Virginia Marriage Laws also violated
the Equal Protection Clause).
335. Id. at 375.
336. Id. at 375-76.
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The court's opinion, written by Judge Henry Floyd and joined
by Judge Roger Gregory, framed the issue before it as "whether
the Virginia Marriage Laws infringe on a fundamental right."037
Judge Floyd did not dispute that for most of this nation's history,
states have refused to allow same-sex marriages.3 3' But this was
irrelevant, he concluded, because "Glucksberg's analysis applies
only when courts consider whether to recognize new fundamental
rights.... Because we conclude that the fundamental right to
marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage, Glucksberg's
* * * *0339
analysis is inapplicable here.
Like the Tenth Circuit in Kitchen, Judge Floyd observed that
the Supreme Court's Loving, Zablocki, and Turner decisions
"demonstrated that the right to marry is an expansive liberty in-
terest that may stretch to accommodate changing societal
norms.""' These cases did not explain marriage as 'the right to
interracial marriage,' 'the right of people owing child support to
marry,' [or] 'the right of prison inmates to marry."34 1 He argued
instead that
they speak of a broad right to marry that is not circumscribed based
on the characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that
right.... If courts limited the right to marry to certain couplings,
they would effectively create a list of legally preferred spouses, ren-
dering the choice of whom to marry a hollow choice indeed.3 4 2
Virginia argued that the aforementioned Supreme Court mar-
riage decisions involved opposite-sex couples and were therefore
inapposite.3 43 Disagreeing, Judge Floyd noted that Lawrence "ex-
pressly refused to narrowly define the right at issue as the right
of 'homosexuals to engage in sodomy,' concluding that doing so
would constitute a 'failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty
at stake."'3 4 4 Lawrence "identified the right at issue . . . as a mat-
ter of choice [and determined] that gays and lesbian[s, like other
individuals], enjoy the right to make [their own] decisions regard-
337. Id. at 375.




342. Id. at 376-77.
343. Id. at 377.
344. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-67 (2003)).
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ing their personal relationships."34 5 Windsor's holding that Section
3 of DOMA was unconstitutional was based partly "on that provi-
sion's disrespect for the 'moral and sexual choices' that accompa-
ny a same-sex couple's decision to marry."346 In Judge Floyd's
view, both Lawrence and Windsor demonstrate that "the choices
that individuals make in the context of same-sex relationships en-
joy the same constitutional protection as the choices accompany-
ing opposite-sex relationships."4
Judge Floyd expressed his belief that the Supreme Court would
not
accord the choice to marry someone of the same sex any less respect
than the choice to marry an opposite-sex individual who is of a dif-
ferent race, owes child support, or is imprisoned. Accordingly, we de-
cline [Virginia's] invitation to characterize the right at issue in this
case as the right to same-sex marriage rather than simply the right
348
to marry.
Having held that the right to enter into a same-sex marriage is
a fundamental right, the Fourth Circuit strictly scrutinized the
state's proffered justifications for its anti-same-sex marriage
laws: (1) a federalism-based interest in controlling the definition
of marriage; (2) the history and tradition of opposite-sex mar-
riage; (3) the protection of the institution of marriage; (4) encour-
aging responsible procreation; and (5) the promotion of optimal
childrearing.4 1 Judge Floyd concluded that none of these interests
excused the state's deprivation of liberty and infringement of the
right to marry.5 o Regarding the history and tradition justifica-
tion, he concluded that the preservation of the traditional and
historical status quo is not a compelling interest, stating that
"[t]he Supreme Court has made it clear that, even under rational
basis review, the '[a]ncient lineage of a legal concept does not give
it immunity from attack.""5 Further,
[t]he closely linked interest of promoting moral principles is similar-
ly infirm in light of Lawrence: "the fact that the governing majority
345. Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567).




349. See id. at 377-78.
350. Id. at 379-84.
351. Id. at 380 (quoting Heller v Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993)).
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in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral
is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the prac-
tice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting mis-
cegenation from constitutional attack."
In its recent ruling in Latta v. Otter, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Stephen
Reinhardt, held that Idaho's and Nevada's constitutional and
statutory provisions preventing same-sex couples from marrying
violated the Equal Protection Clause.' Writing separately, Judge
Reinhardt also would have held that the fundamental right to
marriage recognized by the Supreme Court in Loving, Zablocki,
and Turner includes the right to marry a person of one's choice
and "applies to same-sex marriage just as it does to opposite-sex
marriage."' Noting that the case turned on how the claimed fun-
damental right was described, he reasoned that in the aforemen-
tioned cases the Court referred to "the general right of people to
marry, rather than a narrower right defined in terms of those
who sought the ability to exercise it.""' Thus, the Court's applica-
ble precedents did not ask whether a new and narrow right
should be recognized, or whether the class affected by the at-issue
prohibition of marriage enjoyed a right as that right had been
previously defined; the pertinent question, Judge Reinhardt de-
termined, was whether there was a sufficiently compelling justifi-
cation for denying the plaintiffs' claimed right.56
Idaho and Nevada contended that the denial of a right to marry
a person of the same sex did not deprive gays and lesbians of the
freedom to marry, "as they are still free to marry individuals of
the opposite sex."" Characterizing that contention as "uncom-
prehending" and "unavailing," Judge Reinhardt argued that Lov-
ing rebutted the states' argument."' He argued that Mildred
Jeter and Richard Loving were not completely prohibited from
marriage as they were both free to marry individuals of their own
race; however, they were both denied the freedom to marry the
352. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003)).
353. Latta v. Otter, Nos. 14-35420, 14-35421, 12-17668, 2014 WL 4977682, at *1 (9th
Cir. Oct. 7, 2014).
354. Id. at *11 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).






individual of their choice, which in their case happened to be the
other.'5 Gays and lesbians enjoy the same freedom, for "[a] limi-
tation on the right to marry another person, whether on account
of race or for any other reason, is a limitation on the right to mar-
,,360
ry.
For Judge Reinhardt, defining the right to marry as the right
to marry an individual of the opposite sex makes the same error
that the Court committed in Bowers v. Hardwick.3 1' He noted,
"Fundamental rights defined with respect to the subset of people
who hold them are fundamental rights misdefined."36 2 The ques-
tion for resolution is not whether persons have a fundamental
right to marry a person of the same sex, but whether a person has
a fundamental right to marry "the one he or she loves. Once the
question is properly defined, the answer follows ineluctably:
yes."6
B. A Fundamental Right To Same-Sex Marriage?
As noted in the preceding section, majorities of three-member
panels in the Tenth and Fourth Circuits held that state laws pro-
hibiting same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause." 4 In each case a dissenting judge
reached the opposite conclusion, asking and answering in the
negative the question whether the claimed right to same-sex
marriage is fundamental, i.e., deeply rooted in the nation's histo-
ry and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
The Sixth Circuit has issued a decision rejecting, and creating
a circuit split in, the views of the Tenth and Fourth Circuits. In
DeBoer v. Snyder 6 1 the court upheld Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio,
and Tennessee laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.366 Writing for
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See id. at *13; see also supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
362. Latta, 2014 WL 4977682, at *13.
363. Id.
364. See supra Part IV.A.
365. Nos. 14-1341, -3057, -3464, -5291, -5297, at *1, *26-27, 2014 WL 5748990 (6th Cir.
Nov. 6, 2014).
366. See KY. CONST. § 233A ("Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall
be valid or recognized as a marriage in Kentucky."); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 ("[Tlhe un-
ion of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a
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the court and joined by Judge Deborah Cook, Judge Jeffrey Sut-
ton rejected, among other arguments, the plaintiffs' argument
that the challenged laws violated their fundamental right to mar-
ry, opining that "something can be fundamentally important
without being a fundamental right under the Constitution."" The
question for the court is "whether our nation has treated the right
as fundamental and therefore worthy of protection under sub-
stantive due process [and] the test is whether the right is 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.""
Determining that the right to marriage or to gay marriage does
not appear in the Constitution, Judge Sutton assessed the argu-
ment that the proposed right to same-sex marriage "turns on bed-
rock assumptions about liberty [and that tlhis too does not
work."0" He pointed out that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's 2003 decision was the first state high court redefinition of
marriage to include same-sex marriage.7 0 Judge Sutton further
observed that the Supreme Court of the United States 's Loving v.
Virginia decision confirmed that "marriage" referred to tradition-
al opposite-sex and not same-sex marriage." In outlawing inter-
racial marriage bans the Court "addressed, and rightly corrected,
an unconstitutional eligibility requirement for marriage; it did
not create a new definition of marriage."3 " Reasoning that one
must query "whether the old reasoning applies to the new set-
ting," Judge Sutton concluded that Loving's fundamental-rights
decision did not dictate the outcome of current challenges to
same-sex marriage bans.7  To "shoehorn new meanings into old
marriage or similar union for any purpose."); OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 ("[A valid mar-
riage is] only a union between one man and one woman. . . ."); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18
("[A] relationship of one man and one woman shall be the only legally recognized marital
contract in this state.").
367. DeBoer, 2014 WL 5748990 at *16.
368. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
369. Id.
370. Id.; see Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003).
371. DeBoer, 2014 WL 5748990, at *16 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
372. Id. In the wake of Loving, states could no longer lawfully define marriage as the
union of persons of the same race. See id.
373. Id. at* *17.
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words" would give "evolving-norm lexicographers ... a greater
say over the meaning of the Constitution than judges."374
Consider also Judge Paul Kelly, Jr.'s rejection of the majority's
due process analysis in his dissent from the Kitchen ruling.3 15 Not-
ing that the plaintiffs contended that they were relying on "a fun-
damental right to marriage simpliciter" and not "a fundamental
right to same-gender marriage," he cited Glucksberg and opined
that "given the ephemeral nature of substantive due process,
recognition of fundamental rights requires" both a precise defini-
tion of the right and its being a notion deeply rooted in the Na-
tion's history and tradition."' Because same-sex marriage is a re-
cent phenomenon, it did not meet the prescribed standard that
"for centuries 'marriage' has been universally understood to re-
quire two persons of opposite gender."' Moreover, while same-
sex marriage may one day "become part of this country's history
and tradition, . . . that is not a choice this court should make.""'
Having determined that there is no fundamental right to same-
sex marriage, Judge Kelly argued that the challenged provisions
of the Utah constitution and statute should be upheld as rational-
ly related to "responsible procreation," "effective parenting," and
"the desire to proceed cautiously in this evolving area."379
Dissenting again in Bishop v. Smith, Judge Kelly stated:
"When it comes to deciding whether a state has violated a funda-
mental right to marriage, the substantive due process analysis
must consider the history, legal tradition, and practice of the in-
stitution."8 o Discussing "western marriage," he set out four iden-
tifying features of that institution: (1) exclusivity, (2) monogamy,
(3) non-familial pairs, and (4) gender complementarity, distinct
from procreation." He noted that this historically rooted practice
is the basis for most state laws.8 In fact, "[t]he core marital
374. Id.
375. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1230 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
376. Id. at 1234 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1230.
380. 760 F.3d 1070, 1112 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
271 (2014).
381. 760 F.3d at 1113 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
382. Id.
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norms throughout Oklahoma's history have included these ele-
ments."8 Judge Kelly argued that polygamous and incestuous re-
lationships do not satisfy these elements and do not qualify for
marriage. 38 4 Nor, in his view, does same-sex marriage."'
Judge Kelly also rejected the argument that those who would
deny the right to same-sex marriage on historical grounds "might
just as easily have argued that interracial couples are by defini-
tion excluded from the institution of marriage."3 " According to
Judge Kelly, no one could have made the argument in Loving v.
Virginia that racial homogeneity was "an essential element of
marriage.""'
But Virginia did make that argument in Loving. In the 1967
oral argument before the Supreme Court, Virginia's counsel stat-
ed that Virginia's antimiscegenation law served "a legitimate leg-
islative objective of preventing the sociological and psychological
evils which attend interracial marriages."' Thus, and contrary to
Judge Kelly's supposition, racial homogeneity was deemed essen-
tial to the prevention of the purported evils related to and caused
by racially heterogeneous marriages. Virginia thus believed that
an essential element of marriage was the legal union of a racially
homogeneous couple-more specifically, the legal union of a white
man and a white woman. *
Dissenting from the Fourth Circuit's judgment in Bostic v.
Schaefer, Judge Paul Niemeyer observed that the majority "has
simply declared syllogistically that because 'marriage' is a fun-
383. Id.; see also id. ("Removing gender complementarity from the historical definition
of marriage is simply contrary to the careful analysis prescribed by the Supreme Court
when it comes to substantive due process.").
384. Id.; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that state constitutions "to this day contain provisions stating that polygamy is 'forev-
er prohibited."'). For discussion and criticism of the efforts of same-sex marriage opponents
to draw an analogy between same-sex marriage and polygamy, see Adrienne D. Davis,
Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1955, 1981-86 (2010).
385. See Bishop, 760 F.3d at 1113 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
386. Id. (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1216 (10th Cir. 2014)).
387. Id.
388. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395),
reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note
80, at 979.
389. Cf. id. at 991-94 (conceding that Virginia's antimiscegenation statutes were en-
acted on the premise that the white race was superior to other races and with the inten-
tion that it be kept "pure").
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damental right protected by the Due Process Clause and 'same-
sex marriage' is a form of marriage, Virginia's laws declining to
recognize same-sex marriage infringe the fundamental right to
marriage and are therefore unconstitutional.""'0
Relying on Glucksberg, Judge Niemeyer framed the question
before the court as 'whether the "liberty" specially protected by
the Due Process Clause includes a right' to same-sex marriage.""'
The Bostic majority did not ask "the question necessary to finding
a fundamental right-whether same-sex marriage is a right that
is [so] 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' and
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liber-
ty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed."'" The majority's
approach did not anticipate and failed to explain "why this broad
right to marry. . . does not also encompass the 'right' of a father
to marry his daughter or the 'right' of any person to marry multi-
ple partners.""
Considering the Loving, Zablocki, and Turner marriage cases,
Judge Niemeyer opined that those decisions involved, not the "as-
sertion of a brand new liberty interest," but opposite-sex couples
claiming a right to enter into traditional one man/one woman
marriage.394 Focusing on Loving, he stated that "the Court did not
examine whether interracial marriage was, objectively, deeply
rooted in our Nation's history and tradition."' Moreover, Judge
Niemeyer continued, "Loving simply held that race, which is
completely unrelated to the institution of marriage, could not be
the basis of marital restrictions" and that the Virginia statute
"struck down in Loving. . . had no relationship to the foundation-
390. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 385 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014). According to Judge Niemeyer, the majority "fail[ed] to
take into account that the 'marriage' that has long been recognized by the Supreme Court
as a fundamental right is distinct from the newly proposed relationship of a 'same-sex
marriage[]' . . . a new notion that has not been recognized 'for most of our country's histo-
ry."' 760 F.3d at 386.
391. Id. at 389 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997)).
392. Id. at 386 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721).
393. Id.
394. Id. at 390-91; see also supra Part IV.A.
395. 760 F.3d at 390 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). While the Loving Court did not ex-
pressly set forth a Glucksberg-type traditionalist analysis, it is clear that "the limitation of
marriage to persons of the same race was traditional in a number of states when the Su-
preme Court invalidated it. Laws forbidding black-white marriage dated back to colonial
times and were found in northern as well as southern colonies and states." Baskin v. Bo-
gan, 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014).
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al purposes of marriage, while the gender of the individuals in a
- Y)396
marriage clearly does.
This attempt to distinguish Loving fails. That Judge Niemeyer
believes that race is not related to marriage is not the point. Vir-
ginia law established the traditional and entrenched racist and
white-supremacist marriage regime challenged in Loving.97 The
state argued that "[i]f this Court (erroneously, we contend) should
undertake" an inquiry into the wisdom of the state's antimiscege-
nation law, "it would quickly find itself mired in a veritable
Serbonian bog of conflicting scientific opinion upon the effects of
interracial marriage, and the desirability of preventing such alli-
ances, from the physical, biological, genetic, anthropological, cul-
tural, psychological and sociological point of view.""" The state al-
so advised the Court of the Louisiana Supreme Court's
declaration that a
state statute which prohibits intermarriage or cohabitation between
members of different races we think falls squarely within the police
power of the state, which has an interest in maintaining the purity
of the races and in preventing the propagation of half-breed children.
Such children have difficulty in being accepted by society, and there
is no doubt that children in such a situation are burdened .. . with "a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that ma af-
fect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
In criminalizing different-race marriages, Virginia clearly de-
termined that race was related to the state's conception of a foun-
dational purpose of marriage.40 The state sought to protect and
promote what it viewed as the right kind of marriage-related pro-
creation, furthering its interest in maintaining white-supremacist
racial purity.401 Virginia was unabashedly concerned with the
396. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 392 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
397. See Brief for Appellants at 15, 20-21, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No.
395) (Feb. 17, 1967), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 80, at 763, 768-69 (discussing the history of racism and white suprem-
acy that led to Virginia's antimiscegenation laws).
398. Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 41, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395) (Mar. 20,
1967), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 80, at 834.
399. Id. at 35, reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 80, at 828 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954);
State v. Brown, 108 So.2d 233, 234 (La. 1959)).
400. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6-7.
401. See id. at 11.
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propagation of mixed-race "half-breed children" and what the
Virginia Supreme Court once called the problem of "a mongrel
breed of citizens."40 2 Given these facts and racist realities, the
suggestion that Virginia's antimiscegenation law and same-race
marriage regime had no relationship to the purpose of marriage
is simply wrong, if not egregious.
Do laws prohibiting same-sex marriages unconstitutionally in-
fringe the fundamental right to marry which is protected by the
Due Process Clause? Is such a framing of this important constitu-
tional issue correct or should the question be narrowed as wheth-
er the claimed right to same-sex marriage is a fundamental right
deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition and implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty?
As discussed in this part, the majority opinions in the Tenth
and Fourth Circuit decisions and Judge Reinhardt's concurring
opinion in Latta did not ask the latter question. Instead, and de-
scribing marriage at a broad level of generality, the issue was
framed as one concerning the fundamentality of adjectiveless
marriage. Like those plaintiffs who claimed the right to marry
and not the right to interracial, child-support debtor, or inmate
marriage, two persons of the same sex who wish to marry seek
just that-marriage and not same-sex marriage. On that view,
the same-sex plaintiffs who prevailed in Kitchen, Bishop, and
Bostic sought and obtained the long-recognized fundamental right
to marry enjoyed by opposite-sex couples."'
The Sixth Circuit's DeBoer ruling and the dissenting Tenth and
Fourth Circuits' judges' different and narrow framing of the issue
mirrors the ongoing disagreement within the Supreme Court re-
garding the formulation and application of due process tradition-
alism. Judges Sutton, Kelly, and Niemeyer asked whether same-
sex marriage-"a very recent phenomenon"404 and "a new notion
that has not been recognized for 'most of our country's histo-
402. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (1955).
403. See Robert Barnes, Winning Plaintiffs Press Supreme Court to Take Up Same-Sex
Marriage Cases, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cou
rtslaw/winning-plaintiffs-press-supreme-court-to-take-up-same-sex-marriage-cases/2014/
08/27/90336dc8-2e06-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.html.
404. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1234 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J. dissenting),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014).
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ry"" '-is a fundamental right that is deeply rooted in the nation's
history and tradition. Unsurprisingly, they answered that de-
scriptive question in the negative and adopted a not-traditional-
therefore-not-unconstitutional jurisprudential approach.
Due process traditionalism recognizing only those fundamental
rights and liberties which are deeply rooted in this nation's histo-
ry and tradition unduly limits liberty to those interests already
protected by state laws and constitutional provisions, and can in-
sulate discriminatory traditions from judicial scrutiny. That is so
because
[t]radition per se has no positive or negative significance. There are
good traditions, bad traditions pilloried in ... famous literary sto-
ries ... , bad traditions that are historical realities such as cannibal-
ism, foot-binding, and suttee, and traditions that from a public-policy
standpoint are neither good nor bad (such as trick-or-treating on
Halloween). 406
Imagine that in Loving v. Virginia the Supreme Court held that
the deep roots of antimiscegenation laws in the nation's history
and tradition established the constitutionality of such
measures. 407 Such a result, passively deferential to the then-
extant status quo, would have left in place a traditional, overtly
racist, and white-supremacist marriage regime. Loving correctly
invalidated Virginia's same-race marriage regime, for "[t]radition
per se . .. cannot be a lawful ground for discrimination-
regardless of the age of the tradition."408 The long-recognized
"freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides
with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."409 The
right belongs to the individual and not to the majority who,
speaking through law, traditionally saw interracial marriage as a
departure from, and a threat to, the state's conception of the pur-
ported benefits of racially homogeneous marriages.
405. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d.352, 386 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014).
406. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316
(2014).
407. See Ronald Turner, Were Separate-But-Equal and Antimiscegenation Laws Consti-
tutional?: Applying Scalian Traditionalism to Brown and Loving, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
285, 291-92 (2003); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that "[t]here
is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination
which justifies" Virginia's miscegenation statutes).
408. Baskin, 766 F.3d at 666.
409. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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Grounding judicial analysis of the issue of the constitutionality
of same-sex marriage prohibitions in a history and tradition of an
opposite-sex-only marriage regime is similarly problematic. As
the Court has made clear, "[H]istory and tradition are the start-
ing point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive
due process inquiry,""o and each generation can invoke the prin-
ciples of due process "in their own search for greater freedom."41 '
On this view, past and entrenched beliefs, practices, and concep-
tions do not dictate current constitutional meaning and are in-
stead subject to judicial review and invalidation.
With respect to same-sex marriage, the argument and conclu-
sion that the state can infringe individual choice and "impose a
single heterosexual model of the family on all Americans . . . re-
flects and reinforces stereotyped conceptions of sexuality, gender,
and the family, and in so doing, abrogates the right of gays and
lesbians to make critical decisions about the organization of their
lives."412 Liberty-restricting traditions do not define the scope and
sphere of rights protected by the Due Process Clause. The indi-
vidual's liberty and decision whether to marry and who to marry
is not and should not be infringed upon merely because the state
has traditionally defined marriage as the legal union of a man
and a woman.
CONCLUSION
Tradition and traditionalism have long played and continue to
play an important role in the Supreme Court's substantive due
process analysis and jurisprudence. With respect to the issue of
same-sex marriage, it is likely that the Court will soon take up an
issue of first impression-whether state laws prohibiting same-
sex marriages are constitutional. When that occurs, the Justices
will resume their ongoing debate regarding the outcome-
influential, if not outcome-determinative, framing and definition
of the claimed liberty interest. Do same-sex marriage bans un-
constitutionally infringe on the fundamental right to marry? Or
are such bans constitutional because the claimed right is not a
410. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lew-
is, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (internal quotations omitted)).
411. Id. at 578-79.
412. Franklin, supra note 23, at 888-89.
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right that is deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty? As illustrated by
the federal appeals courts' decisions, the significance of a Jus-
tice's discretion to frame the inquiry as the broader right to mar-
ry query or as the narrower right to same-sex marriage question
is manifest, for the outcome reached will turn on that choice.413
Aware of the perils of prediction, and heeding Justice Gins-
burg's observation that the Court will soon have before it a same-
sex marriage case, this article submits that a majority of the cur-
rently constituted Supreme Court will someday hold that same-
sex couples have the same fundamental right to marry enjoyed by
opposite-sex couples. Counting to five,414 I predict that five Justic-
es-Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan-will
hold, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy,415 that an indi-
vidual's right to marry a person of the same sex is a fundamental
liberty interest. Eschewing a Glucksberg-type traditionalist anal-
ysis, these Justices will focus, among other things, on the ways in
which a same-sex marriage ban demeans and stigmatizes same-
sex couples, interferes with the equal dignity of same-sex mar-
riages, and causes the humiliation of children raised by same-sex
couples. Finding that the right to same-sex marriage is funda-
mental, this group of Justices will strictly scrutinize the ban and
will find the justifications proffered to date by states defending
the opposite-sex-marriage-only regime insufficient. Four Justic-
es-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito-will conclude that same-sex marriage does not meet the
deeply-rooted/implicit-in-ordered-liberty standard of due process
413. See Barnett, supra note 20, at 1490.
414. See Anthony Lewis, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARv. L. REV. 29,
32 (1997) ("Justice Brennan used to joke that a critical talent for a Supreme Court Justice
was the ability to count to five.").
415. Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinions in the Court's three sexual orien-
tation discrimination cases (Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor), all decided by 5-4 votes. Un-
der the Court's informal rules, the Chief Justice, when in the majority, will write the ma-
jority opinion or assign that task to another Justice in the majority. See BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, ScADiA: A COURT OF ONE 423 (2014). When the Chief Justice is not in the majori-
ty, the senior Justice in the majority assigns the majority opinion. Id. On the current
Court, Justice Scalia is the most senior Justice. Id. Scalia is "likely to be in the same vot-
ing clique as the conservative chief and so would seldom be in a position to assign an opin-
ion." Id. Justice Kennedy, next in terms of seniority, assigns opinions when he is in the
majority and Chief Justice Roberts is not. As Murphy notes, "All of this served to anoint
Kennedy as the new 'shadow chief on the Court. By exercising his combined powers as the
Court's swing justice, he could become the institution's most powerful member." Id. at 424.
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fundamentality and will uphold laws banning such marriages as
rationally related to legitimate state interests.
While this prediction will ultimately be proven right or wrong,
a future Court decision recognizing or denying a fundamental
right to same-sex marriage will be a landmark constitutional rul-
ing.
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